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Comment
DAY CARE AND PARENTAL EMPLOYMENT: WHAT WEIGHT
SHOULD THEY BE GIVEN IN CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1994 decision of Michigan trial courtJudge Raymond Cashen, in
Ireland v. Smith,' sparked a new battle in the war of the sexes when he
ruled that custody of a three-year-old girl, Maranda, should be removed
from her mother and awarded to her teenage father.' The reason? Her
mother placed the little girl in full-time day care while she attended classes
at the University of Michigan.3 In contrast, the teenage father lived with
1. 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
2. Id. Steven Smith and Jennifer Ireland were both 16 year-old high school
students when Maranda was born. Id. Ireland initially placed her daughter in fos-
ter care intending to surrender the child for adoption, Id. Three weeks later,
however, she changed her mind and decided to raise the child herself. Id. With
the assistance of her family, Ireland raised her daughter, completed high school
and earned a scholarship to the University of Michigan. Id. Meanwhile, Smith
continued to reside with his parents, completed high school and enrolled in a
local community college. Id. Although he made no attempt to see Maranda dur-
ing the first year of her life, Smith established regular contact with his daughter
after that time. Id.
In the fall of 1993, Ireland moved to Ann Arbor, Michigan to begin classes.
Id. In January 1994, she filed an action for child support. Id. Smith responded
with a petition for custody. Id. Judge Raymond Cashen awarded custody to Smith
because his plan provided for Maranda to be cared for by a blood relative, while
Ireland's plan placed Maranda in the care of "strangers." Id. at 348.
The Ireland decision drew cheers of support from fathers' rights organizations.
See, e.g., Mark Puls, Fathers'Rights Group Joins Maranda Custody Fight Attorney Plans to
Raise Money to Support Smith's Claim That Jennifer Ireland is Unfit Mother, DET. NEWS,
Aug. 11, 1994, at C1 (discussing rulings and prejudice against fathers in custody
disputes). Supporters claimed that courts were finally beginning to recognize that
men have traditionally been penalized for working outside of the home to provide
for their families and were accordingly discriminated against in custody determina-
tions. See Cathy Young, Maranda Rule: Is Joint Custody The Answer?, DET. NEWS, Aug.
2, 1994, at 11 (advocating presumption of joint custody).
In contrast, women's organizations were outraged and viewed the decision as
backlash against working women who were trying to support themselves and im-
prove their standard of living only to risk losing custody of their children. See, e.g.,
Susan Chira, Custody Cases Reveal Bias Against Working Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1994, at B1 (discussing judicial bias towards working women); Anna Quindlen,
Single Moms Can't Win, ST. Louis POST-DISPATcH, Aug. 19, 1994, at 7C (discussing
outrage over decision awarding Smith custody).
3. Ireland, 542 N.W.2d at 347. Jennifer Ireland lived alone with her daughter
in a family housing apartment at the University of Michigan. Id. While she at-
tended classes and worked part-time, Maranda spend approximately 35 hours per
(909)
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his mother who would be able to provide care for the child while he at-
tended classes at a local community college. 4
Finding the teenage parents to be equal in all other respects, the trial
court ruled that the home environment offered by the father, including
daily care by a blood relative, was preferable to a University housing apart-
ment and day care by "strangers."'5 Accordingly, the court determined
that Maranda's best interests would be served by removing her from the
custody of her mother, with whom she had resided her entire life, and
placing her in the custody of her father. 6
Michigan law is typical in that it requires an established custodial ar-
rangement to be disturbed only if the court finds the change to be in the
best interest of the child. 7 The Michigan Court of Appeals remanded the
week at a day care center licensed by the State of Michigan and approved by the
University of Michigan. Id.
4. Id. Steven Smith resided with his parents in his childhood home. Id. He
worked part-time and attended classes at a local community college. Id. His child
care plan provided for his mother to care for Maranda during his absences. Id. at
349.
5. Id. Although the trial court found the day care center "appropriate," it
held that the father's plan to have his mother baby-sit was "better for the child
because she was a 'blood relative' rather than a stranger." Id. Furthermore, the
court held that the father's home was "'a regular home and a regular program'
and therefore preferable to [the mother's] university life-style." Id. Finding the
parents to be essentially equal in all other respects, Judge Cashen found a prefer-
ence for the father under one factor in the state statute: the permanence, as a
family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. Id. Contrasting
the father's child care plan of providing for care by a blood relative in a family
home with the mother's plan which called for the child to live in university hous-
ing and spend approximately 35 hours per week in a day care facility with "stran-
gers," the trial court found a preference for paternal custody. Id.
6. Id.
7. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(3) (Callaghan 1970). Under Michigan law, the
following twelve factors are to be considered by the court in determining which
custodial arrangement will be in the best interests of the child:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the in-
volved and the child; (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties in-
volved to give the child love, affection and guidance and continuation of
the education and raising the child in its religion or creed, if any; (c) The
capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized under the
laws of the state in place of medical care, and other material needs; (d)
The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environ-
ment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (e) The perma-
nence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or
homes; (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved; (g) The mental and
physical health of the parties involved; (h) The home school and commu-
nity record of the child; (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the
court deems the child be of sufficient age to express preference; (0) The
willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the
other parent; (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence
was directed against or witnessed by the child; (1) Any other factor consid-
ered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.
910 [Vol. 41: p. 909
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case finding that Judge Cashen had erred in misinterpreting the scope of
one of the statutory factors as encompassing a determination of whether
one of the party's home and child care arrangements is more acceptable
than the other.8
Although the final chapter of this story has yet to be written, the con-
troversy and publicity surrounding the initial decision has ignited new de-
bate over the consideration of day care and parental employment in the
making of custody decisions. 9 Noted feminists and women's organizations
have expressed outrage at the thought that a mother may risk losing cus-
tody of her children simply because she has the desire to pursue an educa-
tion or a career.10 Supporters of fathers' rights, on the other hand, have
argued that gender based stereotypes have resulted in a longstanding cul-
tural and judicial bias against fathers in custody disputes.1 1 Despite their
differences, these groups argue that the decisions will be more likely to
Id.
8. Ireland, 542 N.W.2d at 352. Judge Cashen had considered evidence regard-
ing the relative home environment and day care arrangements proposed by each
of the parties under factor (e) of the Michigan statute. Id. at 349. The court of
appeals held that factor (e) is designed to address the permanence as a family unit
or of individual parties and whether they will remain intact. Id. The court held
that factor (e) is not designed to allow the trial court to decide whether one custo-
dial home would be more acceptable. Id. Because the trial court related this fac-
tor to the relative "acceptability" of the respective arrangements, rather than the
"permanence" of the custodial units, the court of appeals found clear legal error
and remanded the case for a re-examination of the facts, according to its interpre-
tation of the statute. Id. at 350.
In addition, the mother's counsel also succeeded in havingJudge Cashen dis-
qualified from hearing the remand. Id. at 351-52. The appellate court found no
bias in his initial determination but, in light of the enormous publicity surround-
ing this case and statements by the judge himself, held that "it would be unreason-
able to expect the trial judge to be able to put out of his mind previously expressed
views without substantial difficulty." Id. Accordingly, it ordered that a new judge
hear the remand because in its view "the advancement of the interests of preserv-
ing the appearance of justice and fairness outweigh other considerations." Id.
9. Anna Quindlen, Astonishing Ruling Against Single Mom Simply Out of Touch,
CHI. T~iB., Aug. 1, 1994, at 13. (arguing Ireland decision reflects "Donna Reed
cultural terrorism" that labels working mothers as second rate); Young, supra note
2, at 11 (stating that men have often lost custody due to demanding careers and
need for day care without societal reaction).
10. Charmagne Helton, Mom Loses Custody over Day Care, USA TODAY, July 27,
1994 at 1A (quoting Gloria Woods of National Organization for Women as stating
"' [t] his decision is a slap in the face to working mothers"'); Louis Mleczko, Custody
Case Is a Threat to Working Moms, Critic Claims Fathers for Equal Rights Praises Decision.
"You Can't Judge This on Emotion", DET. NEWS, July 27, 1994, at 1 (quoting Howard
Simon, Executive Director of ACLU of Michigan, as stating "' [e]very working sin-
gle mother is now in danger of losing custody of her children"').
11. See generally Judith Bond Jennison, The Search for Equality in a Woman's
World: Fathers' Rights to Child Custody, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1141 (1991) (discussing
men's lack of progress in obtaining custody of their children); Mleczko, supra note
10, at 1 (quoting Alan Lebow of Fathers for Equal Rights that this decision is "'fol-
lowing legal principles that children are always better off with parents than
strangers"').
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coincide with the best interest of the child by giving consideration to the
nature of each parent's employment and the quality of the child care pro-
vided in their absence.1 2
This debate has focused new attention on current guidelines used by
judges in making custody determinations. In some instances, the debate
has led to proposals for revising the statutory guidelines to prohibit judges
from considering the use of day care as a basis for a custody award.1 3 For
judges, determining which parent will be awarded the custody of a minor
child is perhaps one of the most difficult and challenging decisions they
are called upon to make.1 4 The outcome will affect not only the rights of
men and women, but most importantly, custody decisions may have a life
long impact on the innocent child at the center of the tug-of-war.15
12. See Puls, supra note 2, at C1 (interviewing Holman regarding effect of Ire-
land ruling). According to Phil Holman, founder of the Michigan Chapter of the
National Congress of Men and Children, men are "not on equal footing in the eyes
of the court" in custody cases. Id. Judge Cashen's decision, which emphasizes the
environment in which the child will reside, rather than focusing on the gender of
the custodial parent, has been characterized as "admirably 'gender blind' and
plac[ing] the child in the most stable environment." Julia Prodis, Student Mom
Loses Custody /Judge Objects to Day Care, Dad Gets Girl, S.F. CHRON., July 27, 1994, at
A3 (quoting Philip Holman, Vice President, National Congress for Men &
Children).
13. Valarie Basheda, Bay City Senator Plans Hearings on Child Custody Law Propo-
sal Comes After Court Orders 3-Year-Old Girl to Live with Father, DET. NEWS, Aug. 5,
1994, at 1. In response to public outcry, State Senator Joel Gougeon of Bay City,
Michigan called for a reform in state law that would ensure that a parent does not
lose custody simply by placing their child into day care. Id. According to
Gougeon, the message sent by the Ireland decision is that "if you work and go to
school and have a child in day care, beware." Id. Calling this the wrong message,
Gougeon argues that the threat of losing custody of your child will encourage un-
employment and dependence by discouraging parents from seeking the education
and employment necessary to better their lives as well as the child's. Id.
14. Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d 621, 625 (D.C. 1995) ("Custody determinations
... and termination of parental rights decisions, are among the most difficult a
trial judge must make."); In re Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
("Every current of our lives flows through [child custody cases]. They engage our
most deeply held beliefs, recall our most poignant experiences. No concern is
more precious than our children, not simply because we care so much about their
present happiness but because the future depends upon their wholesome
growth."). See generally Roger M. Baron, Child Custody Determinations in South Da-
kota: How South Dakota Courts Decide Child Custody Cases, 40 S.D. L. REv. 411, 415
(1995) ("Although judges have their own life experiences which may or may not
be integrated into the decision-making process, most judges look upon child cus-
tody determinations as the most serious business they are called upon to under-
take."); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker
as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REv. 481, 482 (1987) ("To choose one from among custo-
dial alternatives is a difficult kind of decision for a judge to make and for a society
to rationalize.").
15. Coles v. Coles, 204 A.2d 330, 331-32 (D.C. 1964). The magnitude of the
custody decision was well expressed by former ChiefJudge Hood of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in Coles:
Out of a maze of conflicting testimony, usually including what one court
called 'a tolerable amount of perjury,' the judge must make a decision
[Vol. 41: p. 909
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Throughout history, the challenge for the courts and legislatures has been
to formulate a method for awarding custody that is in accordance with
ever changing views of family values, family structure, parental roles and
views of child rearing.1 6
This Comment critically evaluates the current standards used for mak-
ing custody awards in light of the changing roles of men and women, and
the American family of the 1990s. In particular, this Comment will focus
on the treatment of parental employment and day care issues in custody
determinations. Part II provides a historical background of the develop-
ment of custody standards.' 7 Part III examines the current jurisdictional
standards, and focuses on the impact of child care and parental employ-
ment factors in these different jurisdictions and their potential for use as
weapons of gender bias.' 8 Part IV examines the American family of the
1990s and the role that day care and parental employment play in our
society.' 9 Part IV also examines the positive and negative aspects of weigh-
ing these factors and examines judicial treatment of these issues in child
custody determinations.20 Finally, Part V critically evaluates the treatment
of these issues in custody decisions and argues for a truly gender-neutral
which will inevitably affect materially the future life of an innocent child.
In making his decision the judge can obtain little help from precedents
or general principles. Each case stands alone. After attempting to ap-
praise and compare the personalities and capabilities of the two parents,
the judge must endeavor to look into the future and decide that the
child's best interests will be served if committed to the custody of the
father or mother. He starts with the premise ... that the best interests of
the child would be served by living in a united home with the affection,
companionship and care of both father and mother, but that possibility
has been eliminated before the case reaches the judge. So, the question
for him is what is best for the child within the limitations presented.
When the judge makes his decision, he has no assurance that his decision
is the right one. He can only hope that he is right.
Id.
16. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in
Child Custody Determinations, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RP. 175, 176 (1992). Professor
Polikoff notes that " [t] he development of standards for awarding child custody
upon divorce has been greatly influenced by changing concepts of family rights
and responsibilities, appropriate sex roles and childrearing theories." Id. For a
thorough discussion of the historical development of child custody standards in
the United States, see MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHERS' PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).
17. For a further discussion on the history of the development of custody stan-
dards, see infra notes 22-77 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the standards currently used by various juris-
dictions and the impact of child care and parental employment in these jurisdic-
tions, see infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the changing role of men and women, and the
American family of the 1990s, see infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the positive and negative aspects of weighing
the child care and parental employment factors, see infra notes 124-243 and ac-
companying text.
19961
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approach. 2 1 This approach will encourage courts to focus on the best in-
terest of the child,' rather than the respective rights of mothers and
fathers.
II. BACKGROUND
Throughout history, courts have formulated standards and indulged
in presumptions, designed to guide the court through the resolution of
child custody disputes. 22 Those guidelines, in large part, reflect prevailing
societal norms and emerging views of child development.2 3 Although
most child custody disputes arise in the context of divorce, an increasing
number involve unwed parents24 or persons who have conceived children
with the aid of new scientific technology, such as surrogacy 25 and in vitro
fertilization. 26 Most courts, either by statute or case law, have held that a
21. For a critical evaluation of the treatment of the issues of child care and
parental employment, see infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
22. Polikoff, supra note 16, at 175.
23. Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary Care-
taker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 291, 294 (1992).
24. Perhaps the best known case of recent times concerning the rights of un-
wed fathers is that of babyjessica. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App.),
affd, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). The DeBoers's attempted to adopt an infant
girl in Michigan with the consent of her biological mother as well as the man
whom she had identified as the father. Id. at 194. After the adoption proceedings
began, the biological mother changed her mind about relinquishment and noti-
fied the infant's true biological father of his paternity. Id. The biological father
brought suit in Iowa and was awarded custody of the infant. Id. The Iowa
Supreme Court ruled that the girl must be returned to her biological father's cus-
tody, who had since married the mother, regardless of the impact on the best
interest of the child. Id. The court held that the father's constitutional rights to
raise his child had been denied because he had not relinquished his rights to the
child. Id.; see also In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994) (vacating adoption of four-
year-old boy who had been surrendered at birth by biological mother who told
biological father that child had died). For a thorough discussion of the rights of
unwed fathers, see Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality:
Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 60 (1995).
25. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). The NewJersey Supreme Court
was called upon to determine the relative rights of a surrogate mother and the
couple with whom she had contracted to carry a child. Id. at 1234. Mary Beth
Whitehead contracted with William Stern to become impregnated with Stern's
sperm and, after delivery, to relinquish all rights to the child to Stern and his wife.
Id. at 1235. After the child was born, Whitehead changed her mind and a custody
battle ensued. Id. at 1236-37. Eventually finding that the child's best interests were
served by awarding custody to the Sterns, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
surrogacy contracts are invalid because they conflict with public policy. Id. at 1238-
40.
26. See, e.g., Davis v. Fertilization Ctr. of East Tenn., No. E-14496, 1989 WL
140495, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Sept. 21, 1989) (examining custody of seven cryogeni-
cally preserved embryo in context of divorce proceeding), rev'd, 1990 WL 130807
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990). For a thorough discussion of legal issues with in
vitro fertilization and embryo transfers, see Kathryn V. Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization
and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973 (1982); Walter
Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465
(1983).
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biological parent has a preference for custody above all others.2 7 When
the biological mother and father do not reside together, regardless of
whether the parents have ever married, courts are forced to decide with
which parent the children should reside.
The battle for custody is often bloody and each parent may be
tempted to use any weapon available in order to win the war. 28 Through-
out history, courts have used rules and presumptions that have reflected
the then prevailing societal structure and social norms.
29
A. Roman Law
Under Roman law, a father had absolute authority over the lives of his
children and enjoyed an undisputed right to custody.30 Based on a view of
children as property, a father could neglect, punish, abandon, sell or put
his child to death without fear of punishment or effect on his right to
custody.31 In contrast, mothers had absolutely no rights and could not
obtain custody of their children, even if the father died and appointed
them as guardian.3 2 This paternal preference rule reflected a society
where children were essentially viewed as the property of their father.33
27. Cooley v. Cooley, 411 So. 2d 750, 755 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (Domengeaux,
J., dissenting) ("A well entrenched legal proposition in our law is that, in the ab-
sence of unfitness, a parent has custody priority over a non-parent."); Edward L.
Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Mother's Status as "Working Mother" as Factor in Awarding
Child Custody, 62 A.L.R.4th 259, 267 (1988) ("As a general rule, the right of a natu-
ral parent to custody of a child is superior to that of a nonparent in the absence of
some sound and compelling reason for denying custody.").
28. Onejudge has described the trial of a contested custody matter as "akin to
the telling of a horror story, where monsters are created." McDonald v. McDon-
ald, No. FA93-0063286, 1994 WL 720343, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1994).
29. See generally MASON, supra note 16, at 1 (discussing general history of child
custody in United States); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 226-28 (1975)
(discussing four issues prevalent in custody cases: weight natural parents' interests
should be given in third party custody disputes; amount of discretion in standards
for custody disputes; simplification of existing legal standards; and who should de-
cide custody disputes and by what process).
30. See O'Kelly, supra note 14, at 486 (noting that under Roman Law, fathers
enjoyed unconditional power over their legitimate children).
31. Arlene Browand Huber, Children at Risk in the Politics of Child Custody Suits:
Acknowledging Their Needs for Nurture, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 33, 37 (1993-94)
(noting that even though father could sell or kill his children, mother had no
rights and was subject to punishment for same acts).
32. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW, CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 492 (2d ed.
1991); see also Sack, supra, note 23, at 294 (noting that under Roman Law, mothers
virtually never got custody of their children).
33. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 492.
1996] COMMENT 915
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B. English Law
English law retained the Roman paternal preference rule, but began
to recognize some limitations on a father's rights. 34 For example, a father
could not kill or sell his children, but he was entitled to discipline them as
he wished and to retain any monies they earned.3 5 Because divorce was
virtually unheard of, custody disputes were relatively rare.3 6 In those rare
instances of divorce or death of the mother, however, the law still reflected
an absolute preference for the father.37 This preference was largely based
on the English concept of primogeniture and the cultural reality that a
woman was unable to provide for herself and children financially.3 8
C. Early American Law
Some early courts in the colonies continued to enforce the English
paternal preference law.3 9 The remnants of paternal preference that ex-
isted reflected the societal reality that women, as well as children, contin-
ued to be considered property of the husband.4 0 Women could not
contract or hold property in their own names. 4 1 Likewise, they had little
34. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452 ("The power of a parent by
our English law is much more moderate; but still sufficient to keep the child in
order and obedience.").
35. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 492. For an in-depth discussion of the
English influence on child custody in the Colonial Era, see MASON, supra note 16,
at 1-47.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Shanley, supra note 24, at 66-70. Shanley states:
[U]nder the common law, a man's legal relationship to his offspring was
determined by his relationship to their mother. If the woman was his
wife, a child was "his," so much so that he exercised exclusive custodial
authority. If the mother was not his wife, however, the child was "filius
nullius," the child of no one. Obviously these rules affected both lineage
and property. They allowed a man to lay claim to legitimate heirs (for
without marriage, who would know for certain who the father of a child
might be?) and to avoid squandering his estate supporting other
children.
Id. at 68-69.
39. Polikoff, supra note 16, at 176-77 (noting that even as late as early 1900s,
only 14 states "had statutorily altered the common law rule of paternal prefer-
ence"); Sack, supra note 23, at 294-95 ("Colonists carried [English common law] to
the United States, and it remained the dominant American custody trend until at
least the mid-nineteenth century.").
40. Huber, supra note 31, at 37-38. Huber notes that this "harsh" paternal
entitlement applied not only to the custody of children, but extended to wives and
slaves as well. Id. at 37. Because children were viewed as an asset of the father's
estate, the father was deemed to have a vested right in their custody, as he would in
any other property. Id. at 38.
41. Karol Williams, Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary Applications as a Support
Remedy, 19 STETSON L. REv. 661, 661 (1990) ("Prior to legislative enactments occur-
ring in the twentieth century, married women had no right under traditional com-
mon law to own property or otherwise manage their financial affairs."). Because
married women could not retain wages, establish credit or even contract in their
[Vol. 41: p. 909
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opportunity to support themselves through employment and any wages
they earned became the property of their husband.4 2 Accordingly, a wo-
man had little opportunity to financially support herself, let alone her mi-
nor children. 43 During the mid-nineteenth century, however, several
factors combined to result in a shift toward recognition of maternal
rights.
44
First, the Industrial Revolution created a situation where more men
were working away from the home, while women remained behind with
the children. 45 Second, child labor and compulsory education laws re-
duced the economic value of children. 46 Third, psychological advances
led to an awareness of the child's need for emotional support.4 7 Finally,
as the status of women began to change, divorce and custody disputes be-
came more common and courts began to move away from a strict paternal
preference. 48
During the 1800s, all states adopted divorce laws and by the 1900s
divorce rates were rising dramatically.49 Initially, all divorce laws were
fault based.50 In the search for a more equitable standard for custody
decisions, some early courts held that it was in the best interest of the child
own names, the sole burden of supporting the wife and children fell upon the
husband. Id.
42. Id. Williams discusses the necessaries doctrine at length. Id. at 663-65.
"At common law, a woman's marriage acted as a constructive forfeiture of any
separate legal identity apart from her husband. As a married woman, she was un-
able to own property, enter into contracts or receive credit in her own name." Id.
at 663-64.
43. Id.; see alsoJennison, supra note 11, at 1143-44 (noting that mothers, were
often deemed "incapable" of supporting children and thus "had no rights to cus-
tody at all" because of inability to earn and retain wages).
44. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1144 (citing urbanization of society, paternal
work outside of home, advancements in psychology and early women's movement
as additional factors contributing to demise of paternal preference); Polikoff, supra
note 16, at 176 (citing Industrial Revolution and compulsory public education laws
as factors contributing to shift to maternal preference); Sack, supra note 23, at 295
(same).
45. Sack, supra note 23, at 294 ("The Industrial Revolution marked a shift
toward a 'maternal preference' standard, which generally gave custody to
women.").
46. Sack, supra note 23, at 295. As compulsory education laws and child labor
laws reduced the amount of time that a child could engage in paid work, the eco-
nomic value of the child decreased. Id.
47. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1144 ("[P]rogress in the field of psychology
created an increased awareness both of the need for emotional nurturing in rais-
ing children and of the importance of the mother's role.").
48. Id. at 1144-45 ("If the paternal preference has once been strong, the ma-
ternal bias under the tender years presumption was overwhelming.").
49. L.M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORy OF AMERICAN LAW 500 (2d ed. 1985) ("[T]he
number of divorces rose from 9,937 in 1867, to 25,535 in 1886 ... by 1900, more
than 55,000 divorces were granted each year.").
50. Id. at 498-99. Under a fault based divorce system, one spouse must prove
that the other committed some statutorily listed offense in order to obtain a di-
vorce. Id. at 207. The precise offenses depended on the particular state's statutory
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to be placed in the custody of the innocent party in the divorce proceed-
ing.5 1 Because the social convention of the time called for the woman to
file for divorce, the result under this rule generally resulted in an award of
custody to the mother.52 This approach, however, was of little use, and
thus was quickly abandoned when no-fault divorce emerged in the twenti-
eth century.55
D. Twentieth Century Rules
As the laws regarding women's rights and divorce changed, so did
custody standards.54 For a brief period during the early nineteenth cen-
tury, there was a complete reversal from a paternal to a maternal prefer-
ence. 55 This maternal preference, however, was short-lived and soon gave
way to attempts to provide a more facially neutral means for determining
custody awards. 56 It was during this time that mostjurisdictions adopted a
"best interest of the child" standard. 57 This standard, however, is arguably
vague and courts have struggled throughout the twentieth century to find
a definitive method of determining what the best interest of the child
means. 5 8 Some courts, for instance, have attempted to adopt presump-
language, but often included desertion, abandonment, cruelty and adultery. Id. at
207-08.
51. Mnookin, supra note 29, at 235-37. This idea followed the presumption
that "[t]he child would be best taken care of and instructed by the innocent party."
Id. at 234.
52. Id. at 234-35 ("Particularly given the social convention that the wife filed
for divorce, courts no doubt awarded custody to the mother more frequently than
to the father.").
53. Id. at 235-36 (stating that trend toward neutral application of best interest
standard result of "[n]o-fault divorce, the changing social conception of appropri-
ate sex roles, and the women's movement").
54. Id.
55. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1144 (noting women's movement secured wo-
men's rights and displaced paternal presumption); Mnookin, supra note 29, at 235
(noting maternal preference rule gave mothers custody unless found to be unfit).
56. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1144-45 ("Because courts believed that chil-
dren of tender years needed the nurturance of their mother, and should be sepa-
rated from her in only the most compelling circumstances; the best interest test
ushered in a new wave in child custody: the tender years presumption." (footnotes
omitted)); Mnookin, supra note 29, at 235-37 (noting majority of states have
shifted to neutral application of best interest standard).
57. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1144. The best interests standard is now the
overwhelmingly dominant standard for divorce custody determinations. Id. at
1145. The majority of states provide statutorily for the best interest standard; a few
states have created it judicially. Id. at 1150-75.
58. Sanford N. Katz, "That They May Thrive" Goal of Child Custody: Reflections on
the Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary
Caretaker Presumption, 8J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'v 123, 129 (1992). Professor
Katz notes that "[flor the past thirty years, there has been a movement by state
legislatures to enact detailed child custody statutes that effectively limit judicial
discretion when interpreting and applying the best interests of the child doctrine."
Id. For the various approaches used by courts to determine what constitutes the
best interest of the child, see infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. For a thor-
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tions favoring one party over the other in order to guide the court and
reduce litigation by lending some predictability to the outcome. 59
1. Same Sex Preference
Some courts have presumed that placing children in the custody of
the parent who was the same sex as the child was in the best interest of the
child.60 At the heart of this presumption was the idea that the same sex
parent was best able to provide an appropriate role model for the child
and to relate to the child throughout his or her development.6 1 Today,
preferences based solely on gender are inconsistent with the current view
that gender alone should not be a determining factor in custody
decisions.62
2. Tenders Years Presumption
Due to evolving concepts of child development in the twentieth cen-
tury, the idea emerged that children, especially of tender years,63 needed
the nurturing of a mother.64 The typical family of this era consisted of a
ough discussion of the inherent indeterminacy of the best interest standard, see
Mnookin, supra note 29, at 255-91.
59. For a further discussion of the presumptions, see infra notes 88-91, 94-100
and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Warner v. Warner, 534 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
best interest of child is furthered by awarding custody to same sex parent based on
psychologist's testimony that same-sex parent identification is important); In re
Clement, 627 P.2d 1263 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (awarding custody of five-year-old girl
to mother who would provide important role model).
61. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 504. Courts following this presumption
generally support it because psychological evidence exists proving that the same
sex parent identification is important to the psychological development of the
child. Id.
62. See, e.g., Elza v. Elza, 475 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Md. 1984) (noting that pre-
sumptions based solely on sex of parent or child are impermissible); Freeman v.
Freeman, 414 N.W.2d 914, 915 (Mich. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that award of cus-
tody to mother solely on basis that children were same gender as mother was abuse
of discretion). But see Gay v. Gay, 737 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding
that trial court did not abuse its discretion by making custody award based on
gender of child).
63. Jurisdictions vary as to what age constitutes "tender years." While the age
of seven is often cited as the end of the "tender years," some experts argue that the
tender years period will end at five or six years of age; yet, others argue that it
continues into the teen years. MASON, supra note 16, at 20 ("The age constituting
'tender years' has been left to judicial discretion, with the teen years usually con-
sidered the upper limit.").
64. Mnookin, supra note 29, at 235. Professor Mnookin describes the evolu-
tion of the maternal preference rule as the formal acknowledgment of the reality
that the mother was the natural custodian. Id. Professor Mnookin states:
Gradually, in the twentieth century, courts came to acknowledge formally
what had perhaps long been the reality. The statutory language, by now
putting the wife on an equal footing with the husband, came to be inter-
preted as giving a substantial preference to the mother, particularly if the
children were young. In the words of a New York appellate court, "the
11
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working father and a mother who remained at home with the children. 65
In light of the respective roles of men and women in the so-called "Donna
Reed" 66 .era of the 1950s and 1960s, a presumption in favor of the mother
made sense. 67 In recent decades, however, as more women are entering
the work place, the traditional sex roles that led to the maternal prefer-
ence and the tender years presumption are rapidly disappearing.68
By the 1970s, rules providing for a maternal preference, as well as
those providing a presumption for the mother based on the tender years
doctrine, began to meet with constitutional challenges.6 9 Although the
Supreme Court of the United States has yet to examine this specific issue,
it has in recent decades struck down a number of state laws that are based
solely on gender distinctions.70 Accordingly, a majority of state courts
have followed the Supreme Court's lead and held that any custody law that
distinguishes solely on the basis of gender is an unconstitutional violation
child at tender age is entitled to have such care, love, and discipline as
only a good and devoted mother can usually give." This maternal-prefer-
ence rule was achieved in various ways: sometimes by statute, often by
judicially constructed rules that it was in the best interest of the child of
"tender years" for the mother-unless shown to be unfit-to have
custody.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
65. For a thorough discussion of the changes in the typical American family,
see Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1993 (1993). For example, in 1960, only "nineteen percent of all
married mothers with children under age six worked outside the home." Id. at
1994. By 1986, the number of married mothers engaged in the work force in-
creased to 54%. Id.
66. DONNA REED SHOW (ABC television broadcast 1958-66).
67. Mnookin, supra note 29, at 235. Professor Mnookin suggests that the
change to the tender years doctrine reflects a formal recognition of "what had
perhaps long been the reality," a substantial preference in favor of the mother. Id.
68. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1141. During the 1950s and 1960s, women
were much more likely to stay at home with the children while their male counter-
parts pursued education and careers. Id. In recent decades, however, women have
entered the work force in dramatic numbers. Id. By 1989, 68% of women with
children under the age of 18 were in the work force. Id. This shift in the work
force resulted in men taking on a more active role in child rearing responsibilities.
Id.
69. See, e.g., State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973).
In 1973, a New York court was the first to hold that a law providing for the determi-
nation of custody based solely on gender represents an unconstitutional denial of
equal protection of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id.;. see also Sack, supra note 23, at 296 ("Even states that have not
expressly disavowed the tender years doctrine have sharply limited its use.").
70. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding law prohibiting alimony
awards to men unconstitutional); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding
law presuming unwed fathers unfit for custody violated Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding law prefer-
ring males as administrators of estates violated Equal Protection Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment).
920 [Vol. 41: p. 909
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of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
7 1
State legislatures have also recognized the problems of gender prefer-
ence in custody disputes and many have specifically enacted legislation
forbidding a preference based solely on the gender of the parent.7
2
Although some commentators argue that the tender years maternal pref-
erence would survive constitutional challenge, 73 the clear trend is to aban-
don both maternal preference and tender years presumptions in favor of a
gender-neutral standard.
74
71. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (holding that tender
years presumption is unconstitutional gender based classification between mothers
and fathers); Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 285 ("[A] pplication of the 'tender years' pre-
sumption would deprive [the father] of his right to equal protection under the law
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah 1986) ("[Glender may not be relied upon as determin-
ing factor in awarding child custody.").
72. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 11 (West 1955) (repealed 1983)
("[0] ther things being equal, if the child be of tender years it should be given to
the mother, if it be of an age to require education and preparation for labor or
business, then the father."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-27-19(2) (1967).
73. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 31, at 63-64. One author has argued that the
state interest in protecting children constitutes a substantial government interest,
sufficient to overcome a rule that is facially discriminatory on the basis of gender.
Id. Huber proffers:
Against arguments that such a presumption presents an unconstitutional
infringement of the equal protection clause, a standard rule of constitu-
tional construction applies: discriminatory rules are permitted to stand
where a substantial governmental interest is found. Respect for the
human needs of childhood-for continuity of care, for stability, for a se-
cure base from which to explore-is essential to any true expression of
governmental interest in the child's welfare. I submit that such a govern-
mental interest, along with a policy supportive of the primary caregiver's
demonstrated past commitment to the care of children, presents substan-
tial matters of overriding governmental concern. In any humane society,
such an interest should overcome the relentless and damaging applica-
tion of mandatory, gender-neutral laws in the determination of child cus-
tody lawsuits. It is a strangely deluded society which pretends that justice
permits no gender differences. The unremittingly egalitarian child cus-
tody laws are repealable. Their repeal is likely to occur only if those who
have been harmed by them act in concert.
Id.; see also MASON, supra note 16, at 27 (arguing maternal preference would survive
constitutional challenge under standards of Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). Mason ar-
gues that these cases provide that a maternal preference is constitutional because it
promotes important governmental objectives and is substantially related to further-
ing those objectives. Id.
74. David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 478 (1984) (noting that although some states still
retain maternal preference in custody disputes, most states have replaced it with
best interests standard). It is also interesting to note that not all feminists support
a presumption in favor of the mother. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Femi-
nist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1060-61 (1992).
For example, Professor Frug criticizes maternal presumption as "not only allo-
cat[ing] disproportionately more child rearing responsibilities to women in formal
13
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A few jurisdictions, however, continue to justify the application of a
tender years presumption when very young children are involved. 75 For
example, in a 1990 opinion, an Ohio court of appeals stated that:
[I] t would be absurd to hold, as a matter of law, that a child's
tender years is never relevant in a custody dispute, especially if
the case involves a baby nursing at the mother's breast. Under
such circumstances, the child's age or tender years is an ex-
tremely significant factor for evaluating the child's best interest.
No matter how equal parents may be in the eyes of the legislature
or the judiciary neither the General Assembly nor the courts can
alter the natural differences between the male and female of the
species. 76
Even in those jurisdictions retaining a tender years rule, some courts have
found that the fact that a mother works outside of the home is a sufficient
basis for overcoming the presumption in her favor.7 7
III. THE CURRENT STANDARDS
Several standards currently exist throughout the United States for de-
termining custody. Generally, most states apply the best interests of the
child standard when making custody decisions. 78 A presumption in favor
of the primary caretakers, however, has gained approval by numerous
courts and commentators in recent years. 79 Also, a few states have statuto-
legal disputes; it also signal[s] to men and women making 'private' decisions re-
garding parenting responsibilities that the legal system expect[s] women to do
more parenting and to do it better than men." Id. at 1060; see also Sack, supra note
23, at 296 ("As long as courts award custody to women on the grounds that 'chil-
dren naturally belong with their mothers,' feminists will have difficulty debunking
the myth that a woman's 'natural' role is that of nurturer and caregiver to
children.").
75. See, e.g., Berry v. Berry, No. CA88-11-081, 1990 WL 25703, at *9 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mar. 12, 1990) (unpublished decision) ("IT] he child's tender years is a factor
which merits consideration in determining the child's best interest and may be the
determining factor if consideration of all other factors still results in relative equal-
ity between the parents.").
76. Id. at *8. The court quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's pronounce-
ment in Adkins v. Children's Hospital. 261 U.S. 525, 569-70 (1923) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting), that "it will take more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me
that there are no differences between men and women, or that legislation cannot
take those differences into account." Id.
77. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Forsyth, 172 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 1969) (holding that
tender years presumption is based partly on assumption that mother will remain in
home full-time); Chastian v. Chastian, 632 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that mother has no superior claim to custody when both parents are
employed and equally absent from home); In re Estelle, 592 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979) (same).
78. For a further discussion of the application of the best interests of the child
standard, see infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
79. For a further discussion of the presumption in favor of the primary care-
taker, see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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rily enumerated factors for the court to consider when making custody
decisions, thus trying to limit judicial discretion.80 Finally, some jurisdic-
tions have adopted a presumption for joint custody, favoring contact with
the child by both parents.8 1
A. The Best Interest of the Child
As a general rule, most child custody decisions today are based on a
determination of the best interest of the child.8 2 This approach was influ-
enced by, and takes its name from, Beyond The Best Interest Of The Child.83
In this 1973 work, three noted child psychologists argue that disputed cus-
tody cases should be decided from the "vantage of the needs of the child
based on [his or her] age, attachments, and stage of development," and
which parent could best satisfy those needs.8 4 This approach has been
widely criticized as too vague and failing to provide sufficient guidance to
courts and to the parties seeking custody, thus increasing the cost and
incidence of litigation.8 5
80. For a further discussion of the various statutorily enumerated factors, see
infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
81. For a further discussion ofjoint custody, see infra notes 94-98 and accom-
panying text.
82. See Mnookin, supra note 29, at 236 ("Divorce custody standards now show
the overwhelming dominance of the best-interests principle."); Raymond, supra
note 27, at 264 ("As a general rule, courts charged with making a determination of
custody must be guided by the best interest and welfare of the child."). The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act defines the best interest of the child:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of
the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1) the
wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of
the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of
the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child's best interest; (4) the child's adjust-
ment to his home, school, and community; and (5) the mental and physi-
cal health of all individuals involved. The court shall not consider
conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to
the child.
UNIF. MAmAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.LA. 561 (1970).
A majority of the states have codified a best interest of the child standard.
Mnookin, supra note 29, at 236. Some states, however, have no statutory standard
but have judicially developed a best interest standard. Id. at 236-37. Most of the
remaining states have broad and vague statutory standards-calling for determina-
tion by such principles as "right and property," "expedient," or 'just and reason-
able"-that have been judicially construed as involving the best interest inquiry.
Id. at 237.
83. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 105-11
(1973).
84. Katz, supra note 58, at 132.
85. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 23, at 297-98. Sack notes that the use of a best
interest standard requires the court to engage in a determination of who is the
"better" parent. Id. at 297. To achieve this determination, the court has too much
discretion and often relies on the testimony of experts such as psychologists, psy-
chiatrists, social workers and sociologists. Id. This expert testimony is often quite
expensive, time consuming and adds a measure of uncertainty to the outcome in a
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As a result, most jurisdictions have endeavored to reduce uncertainty,
and its associated increase in litigation, by creating statutory or judicial
mechanisms for guiding courts in determining what constitutes the best
interest of the child.8 6 Despite this goal, commentators supporting both
fathers' and mothers' rights argue that the vagueness of the current stan-
dards allows for too much judicial discretion and thus, leads to gender bias
in custodial decision making.8 7
battle of the experts situation. Id. at 297-98. Because of this use of experts, Sack
argues that the best interest standard, in practice, acts to disadvantage women who
are likely to suffer significant financial loss as a result of divorce. Id. Sack also
faults the best interest standard as permitting excessive discretion, which can result
in judicial bias. Id. at 298. She writes:
Judicial discretion in the realm of family law is particularly troubling
when viewed from a feminist perspective. Too often, judges base their
decisions regarding family matters on anachronistic, gender-based as-
sumptions about women's place in the family, their sexuality, and their
rights outside the home. Until judges actively seek to replace such anti-
quated, discriminatory modes ofjudicial analysis with ungendered objec-
tivity, women are better served by custody standards that rely less heavily
on judicial discretion.
Id.; see also MASON, supra note 16, at 21 ("[T]he abolition of the presumption in
favor of mothers as the best custodians for young children has left only the vague
'best interests of the child' guideline .... Not only does this make it difficult for
the judge to decide, it encourages litigation, since the determination is unpredict-
able."); Chambers, supra note 74, at 478 ("[T]he current best-interests standard is
both too broad and too narrow to be acceptable.").
86. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 492 (''Custody law in this country can be
seen as a prolonged and strained effort to interpret the open-ended 'best-interests-
of-the-child' standard.").
87. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 31, at 63 (arguing that current best interest
standards ignore fact that "'tender years' presumption favoring mothers for cus-
tody of young children merely reflects the concrete circumstances of ordinary fam-
ily life"); Sack, supra note 23, at 293-94 (arguing that primary caretaker application
of best interest standard, although facially gender neutral, has "a discriminatory
impact on women, denying them equality in practice"); Ronald K. Henry, 'Pimary
Caretaker:' Is It a Ruse?, FAM. Anvoc., Summer 1994, at 53 (arguing best interest
standard, when applied as primary caretaker preference, perpetuates bias against
fathers). One commentator reviewed the findings of several recent state task
forces created to examine alleged gender bias in custody cases. Lynn Hecht Scha-
fran, Gender Bias in Family Courts, FAM. ADvoc., Summer 1994, at 22-28. She
concluded:
The primary disadvantage men face in custody cases, the Utah task force
found, is the categorization of men as less capable and less appropriate
caretakers than women. The task force found that many fathers do not
seek custody because their attorneys advise them that their chances for
success are minimal. The New York task force said men are perceived as
uninvolved parents who must explain their reasons for seeking custody
whereas women are seen as natural parents whose desire for custody is
not only acceptable but expected.
Id. at 26. In contrast, another commentator notes that stereotypes about women
also lead to gender bias. Id. "Mothers also are punished for working outside the
home, because that does not conform to stereotypes of 'good mothers."' Id.
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B. The "Primary Caretaker" Preference or Presumption
At the present time, a majority of states have adopted the theory that
the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the parent
who is the "primary caretaker." 88 The primary caretaker has been defined
as "the person who, before the divorce, managed, monitored the day-to-
day activities of the child, and met the child's basic needs including: feed-
ing, clothing, bathing, and protecting the child's health." 89
One commentator, in a 1984 article, presented three arguments in
support of awarding custody to the primary caretaker: "they know more
about the particular child; they have demonstrated a dedication to meet-
ing the child's needs; and they have built an emotional bond with the
child that may be more important for the child to sustain on a daily ba-
sis." 90 Despite its wide acceptance and facial gender neutrality, the pri-
mary caretaker rule has also met with sharp criticism. 9 1
88. See generally Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking
at Parents with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 557 n.89 (1996) (noting that both
commentators and numerous state courts endorse primary caretaker standard).
Professor David L. Chambers, in his landmark article, criticized the best interest
standard as too vague and failing to provide judges with a coherent framework for
deciding what a child's best interests are. Chambers, supra note 74, at 568. Cham-
bers attempted to define a system that would result in furthering the child's expec-
tations by continuing custody with the parent who had actually provided primary
care during the marriage. Id. at 558-65. Based largely on the child development
theory of attachment, Chambers argues that a child forms a close emotional bond
to the person, male or female, parent or nonparent, that provides for the child's
basic physical and emotional needs at each stage of development. Id. at 560-61. By
awarding custody to that primary care provider, a child is theoretically less trauma-
tized and will adjust better to the changing environment. Id. at 561.
89. Katz, supra note 58, at 133. The concept of the primary caretaker pre-
sumption emerged during the 1980s. Id. at 132. This standard emphasizes the
continuity of care of the child by the primary caretaker after the divorce. Id. at
133.
90. Chambers, supra note 74, at 527. The last of these arguments, that the
primary caretaker has an emotional bond with the child that should be sustained
on a daily basis, "is the one most commonly advanced in favor of the primary care-
taker." Id.
91. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 23, at 297-98. Sack argues that the primary care-
taker standard is discriminatory toward women because it is usually accompanied
by a vague unfitness exception that "invites courts to scrutinize and pass judgment
upon women's sexual behavior, their financial affairs, their living arrangements,
their friends' sexual orientation, and any other factors courts consider 'relevant' to
women's fitness as parents." Id. at 327. In contrast, supporters of fathers' rights
argue that the preference for the primary caretaker is a "masquerade" for equality.
Henry, supra note 87, at 53, Henry argues that although the phrase "primary care-
taker" has a "superficial appeal," it is systematically applied in a manner that is
used to favor the types of functions normally performed by the mother while ig-
noring the father's contributions. Id.; see also LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and
Evolution of the "Best Interests of the Child" Standard, 34 S.D. L. REv. 459, 507 (1989)
(describing primary caretaker doctrine as "a thinly-disguised reenactment of the
tender-years doctrine in gender-neutral form").
In addition, supporters of maternal preference have argued that the gender
neutral primary caretaker rule disadvantages women by allowing fathers to use the
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C. The Listing of Factors Approach
A few states, including Pennsylvania, have attempted to limit the dis-
cretion of courts and thereby provide consistency in custody awards by
providing a statutory list of factors that may be considered in determining
what constitutes the best interest of the child.92 Even though there is no
strict statutory preference for the primary caretaker, the factors to be con-
sidered will generally include the amount of time and care that each party
actually contributes to the care of the child. 93
D. Joint Custody Preference
Based on the assumption that continued contact with both parents is
in the best interest of the child, some jurisdictions presume joint cus-
tody. 94 'Joint physical custody is in reality 'shared' or 'divided' custody."
95
In other words, each parent is entitled to have the child live with him or
her for a specified period of time. 96 As with the primary caretaker prefer-
ence and best interest standard, critics argue that joint custody prefer-
ences also discriminate against both mothers and fathers. 97 Although
joint custody is arguably the alternative least likely to result in gender bias
threat of a custody battle in order to reduce property settlements and support
orders. Huber, supra note 31, at 46.
92. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5) (West 1987); IOWA CODE§ 598.41.3 (Supp. 1996); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131.c(2) (West 1993); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West
Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375.2 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
93. See, e.g., Peckham v. Peckham, 543 A.2d 267, 268 (Vt. 1988) (discussing
Vermont statute and stating that, while it provides number of factors for courts to
consider, it does not require that courts give any one factor, including which party
acted as primary caretaker, any special weight).
94. Sack, supra note 23, at 299; see, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(b) (West 1995); IDAHO CODE § 32-
717B(4) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1A (Michie 1978).
95. Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (Md. 1986).
96. Id. Joint custody can take one of two forms, joint "legal" custody, where
both parents share responsibility for making major decisions about the welfare of
the child, or joint "physical" custody, where parents alternate the companionship
of the child. Id.
97. Sack, supra note 23, at 300 (" U]oint custody is more disadvantageous for
women than for men, since American women still shoulder most of the responsi-
bility for childcare."). Nancy Polikoff, a staff attorney at the Women's Legal De-
fense Fund, has argued that a joint custody presumption is actually detrimental to
children, as well as to their mothers, because it discourages paternal involvement
during the marriage. Polikoff, supra note 16, at 242. She argues that:
Presumptions favoring joint custody upon divorce, regardless of who has
provided care and nurturance during the marriage, actually discourage
co-parenting during marriage by sending a clear message to fathers that
they have a right to intimate involvement with their children upon di-
vorce-if they choose to exercise it-no matter how detached they are
from the ongoing care of their children during the marriage.
Id. But seejennison, supra note 11, at 1184-85 (arguing that presumption favoring
joint custody is best solution to stop bias in custody determinations).
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problems, in practice, it is not a workable solution unless both parents are
willing and able to cooperate. 98
Given the above, it is not surprising that judicial gender bias is a com-
mon claim in child custody disputes.99 As Ireland illustrates, judicial con-
sideration of parental employment and the use of day care in making the
determination will often result in claims of bias.100
IV. ANALYSIs OF JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PARENTAL EMPLOYMENT AND
DAY CARE IN LIGHT OF THE TYPICAL FAMILY OF THE 1990S
Before embarking on an analysis of the judicial treatment of various
factors influencing custody determinations, a description of the evolution
of the traditional American family is necessary. 10 1 Following that discus-
sion, the arguments in favor of such factors as parental employment and
day care in custody determinations will be articulated, 10 2 as well as the
arguments against such considerations.10 3 Finally, the judiciary's treat-
ment of parental employment and day care in arriving at custody decisions
will be analyzed.1 04
A. The Typical American Family in the 1900s
Because custody laws have developed to reflect the existing societal
and family norms, 10 5 analysis of current standards must begin with an ex-
amination of the modern family. The American family has changed dra-
matically in recent decades. 10 6 During the 1960s and 1970s, the typical
98. Sack, supra note 23, at 299. Because of the close level of contact between
parents when custody is shared, ajoint custodial arrangement works only "when an
estranged couple is willing and able to cooperate. Id. This is a particular problem
where a mother has been battered by the father and, due to joint custody, is forced
into remaining in close geographic proximity to her abuser. Id. at 300.
99. See, e.g., Prost v. Greene, 652 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1995) (rejecting assertion
that trial judge reasoning was "inflicted with gender stereotyping"); Linda R. v.
Richard E., 561 N.Y.S.2d 29 (App. Div. 1990) (addressing mother's claim that trial
court did not apply gender neutral standards): Parris v. Parris, 460 S.E.2d 571 (S.C.
1995) (rejecting mother's claim that trial court decision reflected gender bias).
100. Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
101. For a further discussion of the traditional American family, see infra
notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
102. For a further discussion of the arguments in favor of using employment
and day care as factors in custody decisions, see infra notes 139-50 and accompany-
ing text.
103. For a further discussion of the arguments against using employment and
day care as factors in custody decisions, see infra notes 124-38 and accompanying
text.
104. For a further discussion of the judiciary's treatment of employment and
day care in custody decisions, see infra notes 151-243 and accompanying text.
105. For a further discussion of the history of custody standards, see supra
notes 22-77 and accompanying text.
106. See generally, StephenJ. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the
Removal of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247 (1994) (pro-
viding statistical data on changing American family).
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American family consisted of a working husband, stay at home wife
and several children. 10 7 Today, this traditional family is rapidly
disappearing.1 0 8
Divorce is increasing at an alarming rate.' 0 9 Nearly fifty percent of all
marriages in the United States now end in divorce."l 0 An estimated forty
percent of all children born to married mothers will be effected by the
divorce of their parents."' In addition, there has been a dramatic rise in
the number of nontraditional families in recent decades." 12
Given these changes, it is not surprising that approximately one mil-
lion children are affected by custody determinations each year. 31 3 In most
instances, the mother will still retain custody of the children after di-
vorce. 114 In fact, mothers retain custody in approximately ninety percent
of divorce cases. 115 Current divorce law and basic economics generally
107. In reTemos, 450 A.2d 111, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). In Temos, the court
found that "statistics do tell us that the single-parent household has become more
'normal' in recent years than it had been in the past." Id. The court continued to
state that "[o]f all families with children under 18 in 1960, 8.5% were one-parent
families; in 1978, 18.9% of all such families were one parent families." Id.
108. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1145. ("As more and more women have en-
tered the workplace, the typical nuclear family model, which led to the maternal
preference in the first place, has become less and less the norm.").
109. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 458, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH
1991, at 9, 122 (1992). In 1992, there were over 1.2 million divorces in the United
States. Id. Of those divorcing couples, approximately one-half had children. Id.
Each year, approximately one million children are affected by divorce. Id. Of
those children living in single parent homes, only 14% live in households headed
by a man. Id.
110. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103,
1103 (1989). The high rate of divorce in the United States translates into more
married couples ending their unions in divorce than in death. Id.
111. Bahr et al., supra note 106, at 247. At current rates, it is estimated that
nearly half of all children born in the 1980s will spend some portion of their lives
in a household headed by a single divorced parent and, in 90% of these cases, that
parent will be their mother. Singer, supra note 110, at 1103.
112. See generally Melton, supra note 65, at 1993. Nontraditional families, such
as same-sex couples and nonmarried heterosexual couples, are increasing in
number and presenting new challenges in the practice of family law. Id.; see also
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. LJ. 459 (1990)
(discussing lesbian-mother families and their relation to legal system); David G.
Richardson, Family Rights for Unmarried Couples, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring
1993, at 117-26 (discussing evolving definition of family and its changing relation-
ship with legal system).
113. Bahr et al., supra note 106, at 247. In 1993, there were 1.2 million di-
vorces in the United States and about "half of all divorcing couples had at least one
minor child." Id.
114. Singer, supra note 110, at 1103.
115. Polikoff, supra note 16, at 177. There is, however, sharp disagreement
over what this statistic actually reflects. Polikoff argues that the 90% rate reflects
the reality that fathers simply do not want custody in the vast majority of cases. Id.
In contrast, Jennison argues that men often do not seek custody because they be-
lieve that mothers will almost always win and if fathers perceive that they cannot
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require that the custodial parent find some means of supporting himself
or herself and providing, at least to some extent, for the support of his or
her children, regardless of which parent retains custody. 116 Where young
children are involved, the custodial parent, regardless of gender, will most
likely need to make some arrangement for the care and supervision of the
children while they are working, or preparing to work through education
or training.1 17 For women, who still generally earn less than their male
counterpart, the impact of divorce may have a devastating economic effect
on them.11 8
Just as the economic and family resources of the custodial parent vary,
so too will the type and quality of day care that they can obtain.' 19 In
addition, the nature of the custodial parent's employment will often dic-
tate the amount of time and regularity of hours that a child spends in the
care of someone other than the parent.12 0
Because of these recent changes in the American family, the issues of
parental employment and the use and quality of day care have become
increasingly prevalent in custody disputes.121 All courts considering the
win, they are unlikely to take on the emotional and financial burdens of a custody
fight. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1175-79; see also Bahr et al., supra note 106, at 255
(stating that "only a small percentage of fathers are awarded sole custody while
mothers continue to be awarded sole custody in a large majority of custody cases").
116. See MASON, supra note 16, at 25. Because almost all parents, both mother
and father, must work following divorce, " [t]he actual physical caretaking of chil-
dren may be, by necessity, largely in the hands of a paid caretaker, either inside or
outside the home." Id. Alimony, if awarded at all, is generally temporary. Anu R.
Mathur, Indefinite Alimony: A Solution to the Financial Trauma of Divorce, 10 PROB. L.J.
303, 303 (1991) (noting "courts have increasingly awarded temporary, rehabilita-
tive alimony").
117. See Linda R. v. Richard E., 561 N.Y.S.2d 29, 33 (App. Div. 1990) ("We
know that for a variety of reasons, mothers as well as fathers of even young chil-
dren are, or must be, gainfully employed.").
118. See generally LEONOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UN-
EXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 323 (1985) (providing thorough discussion of economic impact of di-
vorce on women). WEITZMAN, supra note 116, at 323.
119. Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). Some
custodial parents may be fortunate enough to have relatives available and willing to
provide child care while they work. See, e.g., id. at 675-76 (noting father's parents
were available to care for child). This option, however, may not be possible for
others. Id. As the Fitzsimmons court noted, the presence of relatives to care for the
child may indeed be a plus, however, the absence of relatives and the correspond-
ing need to use paid care providers alone is not a sufficient reason to deny an
otherwise fit parent custody. Id. at 675-76.
120. See e.g., Appelgate v. Appelgate, 399 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(noting mother's recent employment leaves insufficient time for her to spend with
children, and "constant shuffling of the children to the babysitter's" is evidence
that "children's present environment endangers seriously their physical, mental
and emotional health").
121. See, e.g., Gulyas v. Gulyas, 254 N.W.2d 818 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (af-
firming award of custody to father in part because mother was more ambitious in
pursuit of her career); Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (N.D. 1986) (af-
rming award of custody to father in part because of availability of family members
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issue of maternal employment have held that it is a relevant factor in cus-
tody decisions. 122 Some argue that consideration of a mother's employ-
ment as a negative factor in custody determinations is a violation of equal
protection; nonetheless, many courts have held it to be constitutional so
long as parents are treated equally. 123
B. The Argument Against Considering Employment and Day Care Factors
The argument against consideration of employment and day care is
generally based on the premise that these factors will be unfairly weighed
against working mothers. 124 As the outcry following the Ireland decision
illustrates, many argue that women will be encouraged to forego opportu-
nities to better their lives, and the lives of their children, out of fear that
they will lose custody. 125
to assist in care of children); In re Temos, 450 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(holding that mother's increased career-orientation and reliance on baby-sitters
insufficient to warrant change in custody).
122. Raymond, supra note 27, at 264-67. Raymond notes:
All courts which have considered the issue have found the mother's em-
ployment to be a relevant factor to be considered in awarding child cus-
tody and such consideration has been held by at least one court not to be
a denial of equal protection .... Naturally, the fact that a mother works is
only one of many factors courts will consider in making a custody
determination.
Id.
123. See, e.g., In re Estelle, 592 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Estelle
involved a Missouri law which permitted consideration of maternal employment
outside of the home in making custody determinations. Id. at 277. The mother,
after losing custody, challenged the law as a violation of equal protection. Id. The
court held that the law is constitutional because at most, it placed parents on equal
footing, rather than treating working women differently. Id. at 278; see also Mc-
Creery v. McCreery, 237 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Va. 1977) (holding consideration of ma-
ternal employment is permissible. so long as men and women are not separated
into classes according to sex).
124. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 16, at 25 ("There is, in fact, evidence that
many judges are critical of working mothers who no longer play the full-time care-
taker role."); Polikoff, supra note 16, at 180 (arguing that "a man with a full-time
job who provides any assistance in childrearing, however limited, looks like a dedi-
cated father, while a woman with a full-time job who still does primary, but not all,
caretaking, looks like 'half a mother, dissatisfied with the childrearing role").
125. Editorial, Myopic Judge Aid, Don't Punish, Single Parents, NEWSDAY, Aug. 8,
1994, at A20. As one letter to the editor of Newsday illustrates, many women fear
that consideration of the day care issue will leave women to choose between eco-
nomic independence and welfare. Id. The letter noted:
She can get a quality education and go on to be a productive taxpayer,
but she'll lose her child in the bargain. The alternative is to go on wel-
fare and keep her daughter. But then she'd be locked into a life of pov-
erty and dependence. No one wins when courts force young mothers to
make choices like that.
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Whether they do so out of personal desire or simple economic need,
mothers are entering the workforce in increasing numbers.' 26 For most
of these women, whether married or single, child care is simply a necessity
of life.12 7 Furthermore, punishing mothers for working seems to be at
odds with current trends in social reform that are geared toward forcing
mothers to work outside of the home, even if they would prefer to remain
at home with their young children.1 28 Thus, it is argued that when a court
considers the use of alternative child care, or examines the quality of the
care provider, it is placing working mothers at a distinct disadvantage.1 29
Although more women now work outside of the home, and many
have entered into high paying careers, they generally still earn considera-
bly less than their male counterparts.'3 0 The fact that fathers typically
have greater economic resources may arguably discriminate against
mothers who must spend less on child care arrangements.13 '
126. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 492 (Cal. 1986) (finding that over 50%
of mothers, and nearly 80% of divorced mothers, are currently in workforce).
127. Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671, 675 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)
("'The working mother is a common and often necessary phenomenon in our
society, and need not reflect on the adequacy of the mother's parenting ability"')
(quoting Greene v. French, 641 P.2d 524 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982)). The court in
Fitzsimmons, went on to note that "the trend in New Mexico case law is towards
encouraging a divorced spouse to gain economic autonomy so as to extricate her-
self or himself from a position of dependency." Id. But see Brito v. Brito, 794 P.2d
1205, 1210 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing Fitzsimmons in situation where
mother was member of armed services and moved six times during five-year-old
daughter's life).
128. See Johanna Brenner, Toward a Feminist Perspective on Welfare Reform, 2
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 99, 99 (1989) (discussing effects of proposed welfare reform
on single mothers).
129. Polikoff, supra note 16, at 179-81. Polikoff argues that a woman who is
forced to work is disadvantaged in several respects. Id. First, she is disadvantaged
because courts often give too much weight to the husband's superior economic
resources, a factor that could be equalized by awarding an enforcement of child
support. Id. at 179. Second, Polikoff argues that women who work and share child
rearing responsibilities are viewed as only half-parenting, while a husband who
works full-time and contributes some or any assistance in child rearing is viewed as
a dedicated father. Id. at 180. Finally, Polikoff argues that a working mother often
loses custody because the father has available a new wife, or a parent, who is avail-
able to stay with the child while he is at work. Id. at 181. She argues this is true
regardless of whether the mother has remarried because courts often down play
the role that the stepfather will play in child rearing assistance. Id. at 182.
130. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1981 WEEKLY EARN-
INGS OF MEN AND WOMEN COMPARED IN 100 OCCUPATIONS (Mar. 7, 1982) (report-
ing that female workers earn on average 64.7% of what male counterparts earn
and concluding that there is no job category in which women earn as much as
men).
131. Polikoff, supra note 16, at 178-79. Polikoff argues that a father's superior
economic resources are often used as a basis for awarding custody. Id. The judi-
cial reasoning, claims Polikoff, is that the father has greater material assets that can
be made available for the child enabling him to provide a more economically en-
riched environment. Id. at 179. This logic, however, ignores the purpose of child
support which is to equalize the financial burden of childrearing and increase eco-
nomic resources available for the child. Id.
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For those women who have achieved financial success, the time de-
mands of a career present a particularly serious threat to custody because
of the amount of time that they must rely on child care providers.13 2 The
highly publicized custody battle involving O.J. Simpson prosecutor Marcia
Clark is illustrative of the all too common situation in which a woman
achieves notoriety and success in a traditionally male dominated field,
only to risk losing custody of her children because of the demands of that
career. 
133
Furthermore, as our society has become more mobile, working
mothers, like their male counterparts, are often required to relocate in
order to advance in their careers. 13 4 This potential for relocation,
whether for employment advancement or to pursue a new relationship,
has often been used to deny or modify custody awards to mothers.1 3 5
When a father enters into a new relationship, the presence of a stay at
home stepmother has been used as a basis for denying custody to a work-
132. Susan Estrich, Marcia Clark Deserves Better, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 1995, at
I1A ("The greatest obstacle to women's professional success today is not discrimi-
nation based on sex but the seemingly neutral rules of work that require them to
choose every day between their jobs and their kids.").
133. Joh Rofe, O.J. Simpson Trial After the Verdict, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov.
15, 1995, at Al (commenting that Clark's 18-hour workdays were used by her hus-
band when he sought custody of their two children); Those Seeking Conviction See
Work Vanish; Clark Remains Stoic, But Darden Breaks Down; The Prosecution, BALTI-
MORE SUN, Oct. 4, 1995, at 14A (noting Clark's husband sought "custody of their
two young sons because of her long work hours"). Gordon Clark, ex-husband of
Los Angeles County Prosecutor Marcia Clark, brought a suit seeking custody of the
couple's two minor children claiming that the O.J. Simpson trial was consuming
too much of the mother's time. Estrich, supra note 132, at 11A; see also Prost v.
Greene, 652 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1995) (involving mother's appeal of custody determi-
nation in favor of father, which had been based, in part, on her devotion to her
career, which trial judge found took precedence over her family). For a general
discussion of the problems of professional women in custody disputes, see Laura
Mansnerus, The Divorce Backlash: For Professional Women, the Price of Getting Out of a
Marriage-and Keeping the Children-Is Getting Higher, WORKING WOMAN, Feb. 1,
1995, at 40.
134. For a thorough discussion of the problem of child custody and parental
relocation, see Janet M. Bowmaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between
Parents in a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791 (1992-93).
135. See In re Nodot, 401 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (revoking custody
from mother who wished to relocate to Indonesia with new husband and awarding
custody to father who intended to remain in Illinois). See generally Bowmaster,
supra note 134, at 800 (discussing problem related to relocation). When a custo-
dial parent relocates, contact with the noncustodial parent may be entirely cut off.
Id. at 793-94. This disadvantage must be weighed against the right of the custodial
parent to move to pursue career opportunities, education or even a new relation-
ship. Id. at 792-93. Bowmaster argues that placing the burden on the custodial
parent to prove that the relocation is in the best interest of the child acts as a
disadvantage to mothers, who tend to follow a new husband to his chosen place of
residence, while favoring noncustodial fathers who are likely to have already cho-
sen to establish themselves in the area of their choosing. Id. at 883.
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ing mother who must rely on professional child care providers.1 3 6 In con-
trast, when a mother remarries, the availability of a stepfather as a second
caretaker is often ignored.' 3 7
Finally, there is more data now available analyzing the effects of day
care on child development. Most experts now agree that quality child care
is not detrimental to a child and can in fact provide benefits to the child's
social and educational development. 138 Thus, it is argued that day care is
not detrimental and should not be considered negatively in custody deter-
minations or be considered as inferior to in-home care by a relative.
C. Arguments For Consideration of Day Care and Parental Employment
The amount of time that a child spends in day care will vary from case
to case depending upon the demands of parental employment and the
resources available. For some children, especially the very young, ex-
tended amounts of time spent in day care may have a detrimental effect
on the child's development.' 39
It is this perception that care by strangers may be damaging, or at
least less desirable than care by a relative, that supported Judge Cashen's
decision in Ireland.140 With the clear trend throughout the country to
consider which parent is the primary caretaker of the child, the question
must be asked who is the primary caretaker of a child who is in day care
for forty to sixty hours per week? 14 1 Those supporting the consideration
136. Simmons v. Simmons, 576 P.2d 589 (1978). In Simmons, for example,
the court awarded custody of two small children to a millionaire oil executive be-
cause he had remarried and the stepmother was available to provide daily care. Id.
at 590. In contrast, the mother, who owned a chain of cosmetic studios, employed
a full-time housekeeper to care for the children. Id. Relying on the fact that the
father remarried and that "he and his wife were willing and able to offer the chil-
dren a more stable home environment," the court upheld a change of custody to
the father. Id. at 592.
137. See Polikoff, supra note 16, at 181-82 (noting that presumption of addi-
tional childcare provider in home arises only when father remarries). This double
standard has led some commentators to conclude that courts giving weight to the
availability of a stepmother caretaker "without valuing the pre-existing bond be-
tween the children and their primary caretaker mother comes dangerously close to
implying that mothers are fungible-that one women will do just as well as another
in rearing any particular children." Id. at 182.
138. D. Kelly Wiesberg, Professional Women and the Professionalization of Mother-
hood: Marcia Clark's Double Bind, 6 HI-AsTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 295, 314 (1995). Wies-
berg reports that women's roles have changed so that children now need a small
amount of quality time with a parent as noted by sociologist Arlie Hochschild. Id.
139. PENELOPE LEACH, CHILDREN FIRST (1994). Penelope Leach, a renowned
child psychologist, has recently criticized the use of day care for children under
the age of three. In her book, Leach argues day care nine hour per day may dam-
age the development of a child under three years old. Id.
140. Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
141. Bruce Ziff, The Primary Caretaker Presumption: Canadian Perspectives on an
American Development, 4 INT'LJ. L. & Fm. 186 (1990). In an era when both parents
often work outside of the home, Professor Ziff points out that identifying the pri-
mary caretaker may not be an easy task when the child is cared for by a nonparent
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of the day care arrangement view the factor as leveling the playing field. 14 2
Traditionally, men have worked outside of the home in order to provide
for the economic survival of the family.143 To some extent, this fact sup-
ported a maternal preference in custody because mothers who spent the
entire day with their children were assumed to have developed a closer
relationship than a father who is absent eight or more hours per day.1 44
Under the traditional approach, the father who was awarded custody
would usually need someone to care for the child during the day, so it was
sensible to award custody to the mother who was at home. 145 But today,
with more women working outside of the home, it is arguably appropriate
to consider which parent plans to provide a more stable and desirable
environment for the child during working hours.
Furthermore, men argue that failure to consider day care and em-
ployment factors penalize the father for his ability to earn more. Men,
who have devoted hours to providing for the economic well being of their
family, argue that they have been prevented from engaging in daily care of
a substantial amount of the day. Id. In another article criticizing the primary care-
taker rule as biased against fathers, one commentator argued that in an "ever-
increasing number of two-career couples, the primary caretaker is likely to be a
day-care center." Henry, supra note 87, at 54.
142. A mother who stays at home and cares for the children while the father
works is generally presumed to be the primary caretaker, and thus generally enjoys
a presumption in her favor when a custody dispute occurs. In re Maxwell, 456
N.E.2d 1218, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). This fact, however, ignores the eco-
nomic reality that men often "do not choose to continue to work after their chil-
dren are born; they have to work." Jennison, supra note 11, at 1183. The fact that
men in most cases will earn more than their wives, and thus are able to provide
more economic support for the family, should not be held against a father as evi-
dence that he does not care about his children. Id.
143. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1184 (noting that men have been socially
conditioned to be "bread winner").
144. Id. at 1183. Jennison writes:
Traditionally, women were expected to stay home and raise the children,
and men were expected to go out and earn a living. Just as the prejudice
in favor of women as 'the better parent' withstands a more modern cul-
ture, the pressure on men to be bread winners has survived as well. This
pressure, along with the fact that men still earn more, on the average,
than women, leaves most men little choice as to whether they will work or
stay home with the children. Most couples cannot afford to forego the
salary the husband is capable of earning, and therefore either he works
while his wife stays home, or they both work .... Thus, the fact that a
father may have worked instead of staying home with the children should
not be used as evidence that he doesn't care about his children.
Id. (footnote omitted).
145. Cooley v. Cooley, 411 So. 2d 750, 753 (La. Ct. App. 1982). The court
stated that:
[T]he maternal preference rule is historically based on the concept that
where a father is out working, beating the bushes trying to make a living
for his children and his spouse who is at home taking care of the children
twenty-four hours a day, that it is easy to conclude that under those condi-
tions the mother is the natural custodian.
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the children for economic reasons because either the wife chose to devote
more time to child rearing or because of the economic reality that the
man had the potential to earn more.1 46
Despite their traditional role as the breadwinner, fathers are now
more involved in the daily care of their children. 147 It is now more socially
acceptable, and even admirable, for a man to assume a nurturing role.1 48
As a result, many fathers are developing closer psychological bonds with
their children and experience a "severe sense of loss" following divorce
and separation from their children.14 9
A final argument for considering the relative quality of the care pro-
vider is that courts have already shown a willingness to consider the rela-
tive quality of school districts in custody disputes involving school aged
children.1 5 0 If the courts will consider the benefits that one school district
may have over another, is it such a leap to consider the relative merits of
two different day care arrangements?
Currently, courts are trying to balance each of these competing con-
siderations and to provide outcomes that are in the best interest of the
children. The relative weight of these factors, and the arguable bias of
some courts, has led to inconsistent results.
D. Judicial Treatment of Parental Employment and Day Care Use
Courts have varied in their treatment of day care and parental em-
ployment in custody determinations. The courts appear to fall into two
146. Henry, supra note 87, at 53. Henry argues that current primary caretaker
standards fail to give consideration to the father's efforts to provide financial secur-
ity to his child and family. Id. Noting that "[n]o one seriously disputes the role of
father absence in street gang formation, teenage pregnancy, and other patholo-
gies," Henry argues that caretaker standards consistently fixate on mothering while
ignoring the importance of fathering. Id. To illustrate his point, Henry notes that
current standards often "gives credit for shopping but not for earning the money
that permits the shopping; for laundering the Little League uniform but not for
developing the interest in baseball; for vacuuming the floors but not for cutting
the grass; and for chauffeuring the children, but not driving to work." Id.
147. Robert E. Fay, The Disenfranchised Father, 9 AM. J. FAM. L. 17, 19 (1995).
Dr. Fay points out that not only are fathers more involved in the daily care of their
children, they also do much more of the physical play with the children. Id. Fa-
thers would do even more in terms of nurturing the children, argues Fay, if not for
overwhelming pressures to defer to the mothers' traditional role. Id.
148. LETTY C. POGREBIN, GROWING UP FREE: RAISING YOUR CHILD IN THE 80s
26 (1981).
149. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1175. Jennison notes that it is "a myth that
fathers walk away from their family after a divorce unscathed." Id. The loss that
many men experience following divorce may actually lead to physical and psycho-
logical manifestations. Id.
150. For a thorough discussion of the relative quality of school districts as a
factor in custody litigation, see William L. Bainbridge, School Quality: An Important
Issue in Child Custody Disputes, 7 AM. J. FAm. L. 45 (1993). Dr. Bainbridge is the
founder of SchoolMatch, a comprehensive research and information service pro-
viding expert evidence regarding the relative quality of prospective school place-
ments. Id. at 45.
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camps; those protective of the rights and reality of mothers that work,15 1
and those that strive for a gender neutral approach treating working
mothers and fathers equally.1 5 2
In support of working mothers, some courts have explicitly stated that
a mother should not be viewed as a less satisfactory parent, simply by virtue
of the fact that she works full-time. 153 For example, in Burchard v.
Garay,154 the California Supreme Court held that a trial court exhibited an
"insensitivity to the role of working parents," by finding the father's child
care arrangement, provided by the child's stepmother, superior to the
mother's reliance on paid child care. 155 In reversing the award, the court
stated that "in an era when over 50 percent of mothers and almost 80
percent of divorced mothers work, the courts must not presume that a
working mother is a less satisfactory parent or less fully committed to the
care of her child."' 56 The Burchard decision not to consider a woman's
151. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 494 (Cal. 1986) ("Typically, it is the
mother who provides most day-to-day care, whether or not she works outside the
home."); In re Kush, 435 N.E.2d 921, 922-23 (111. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that use
of three different baby-sitters and occasionally leaving nine and eleven years olds
alone did not warrant denial of custody to mother who worked full-time and at-
tended classes); Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671, 676 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that availability of paternal grandparents to care for children was
positive factor in favor of father, but insufficient basis for denying custody to work-
ing mother who utilized adequate paid child care arrangements); Wellman v.
Dutch, 604 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 1993) (reversing award of custody of child
born out of wedlock to father and his homemaker wife as having "the impermissi-
ble effect of depriving... unmarried working mother, of her equal right to cus-
tody," despite fact that child was in day care nine to thirteen hours per day).
152. See, e.g., Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D.
1985) (holding that career mother not any more disqualified for custody than ca-
reer father); Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d at 675 (finding that mother's employment
should be given same weight as father's employment in custody determinations;
McCreery v. McCreery, 237 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Va. 1977) (rejecting mother's claim
that consideration of her employment violated equal protection because her em-
ployment was not treated different than father's).
153. Burchard, 724 P.2d at 493 (Bird, J., concurring) (stating that "when it is
no longer the norm for children to have a mother at home all day, courts cannot
indulge the notion that a working parent is ipso facto a less satisfactory parent");
Greene v. French, 641 P.2d 524, 527 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that working
mother is increasingly common and necessary phenomenon in our society and
does not reflect on ability of woman to be fit parent).
154. 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986).
155. Id. at 488. In Burchard, the child was conceived out of wedlock and the
father did not have contact with the child until the mother filed a paternity and
support action. Id. at 487. After a brief failed attempt to live as a family, the
couple separated and a custody battle ensued. Id. The trial court awarded custody
to the father for three reasons: he was better equipped to provide for the child's
financial needs; he had remarried and his new wife could provide child care rather
than rely on caretakers as the mother must do; and the mother had displayed an
unwillingness to comply with visitation. Id. at 488.
156. Id. at 492 (footnotes omitted). The court considered the following fac-
tors in determining custody: (1) assessment of the emotional bonds between par-
ent and child; (2) inquiry into parent-child relationships; and (3) factual
determination of how best to provide for the continuing care of the child. Id.
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career or work requirements in custody hearings prevents women from
being discouraged from providing financial security for themselves and
their children.' 57
Taking this position a step further, in In re Temos,1 58 one court stated
that depicting the mother as "career-oriented" is a compliment rather
than a censure. 159 In Temos, a Pennsylvania superior court reviewed a trial
court's modification of custody of a seven-year-old girl and six-year-old
boy. 160 The mother had retained primary physical custody of the children
following divorce. The father, however, petitioned for a change of custody
in part because of the single mother's allegedly increasing career ambition
and her corresponding reliance on babysitters. 16 1
The father had remarried and now lived with his new wife, a full-time
homemaker, and her two children from a prior marriage.1 62 In contrast,
the mother lived in a townhome and worked forty hours per week as a
hospital supervisor. 16 For four hours per day, she relied on a babysitter
to care for the children until she returned home from work. 164
Regarding maternal employment and day care, the trial court sup-
ported its award of custody to the father stating that "[w] hile faced with no
other choice when their marriage ended, the mother has become increas-
ingly career-oriented. She has placed heavy reliance on babysitters ....
[The father] enjoys a stable, loving marriage with a wife who is willing and
able to share their home with their children."1 65 The appellate court took
sharp exception to the trial court's statements. 166 Viewing "career-orienta-
tion" as a positive virtue, the court set forth its view regarding the weight to
be accorded parental employment and day care. 167
[I]f a parent's desire for promotion were to result in interfering
with the parent's ability to care for the children, then that would
157. For a complete discussion of the arguments against considering these
factors, see supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
158. In re Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that "'to
become increasingly career-oriented' seems to us to be a compliment, not cen-
sure-to be one way of saying that the mother has become increasingly interested
in trying to do better and more responsible and challenging work.").
159. Id. The court explained that for a mother to become more "career ori-
ented" is a way of saying the mother is trying to do "more responsible and chal-
lenging work." Id.
160. Id. at 112.
161. Id. In addition, the father also claimed that the mother's involvement
with an African-American married man and her involvement in questionable fi-
nancial transactions were sufficient changes in circumstances to warrant a change
of custody. Id.
162. Id. at 121.
163. Id. at 113.
164. Id. at 114.
165. Id. at 125.
166. Id. at 117. The court stated that "we find ourselves ... in quite funda-
mental disagreement with the lower court." Id.
167. Id. at 125.
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be evidence against awarding custody to the parent. For exam-
ple, a parent who insisted upon accepting a promotion even
though the promotion would require extended absences from
home might very well not be entitled to custody. Choices have to
be made, and it is a fair question for a court to ask whether a
parent cares more about achieving a promotion or being able to
devote time to the children.1 68
Because the mother in Temos held a steadyjob with regular hours, the
court found no evidence to support the trial court's finding that the
mother prioritized her career or that it interfered with her concern for
her children.1 69
There are, however, situations where either parent's career demands
long and irregular hours that may interfere with their ability to parent.170
For example, in Prost v. Greene,171 a District of Columbia Court of Appeals
faced a situation where the mother was engaged in a demanding legal
career.' 72 The trial court found that both parents were fit but awarded
custody to the father largely because of the mother's devotion to her
highly demanding career as chief counsel for the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's Subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources.' 73 In contrast,
the father, also an attorney, had limited his career, turning down opportu-
nities and accepting lower paying jobs and periods of unemployment be-
cause they would have would have interfered with the amount of time
available for his children. 174 Despite claims that the trial court decision
was "infected with gender stereotyping," the appellate court found no gen-
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d 748, 749 (N.D. 1986). In Bashus, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld an award of custody to the father of four
children based upon the trial court's finding that the mother's pursuit of a career
in music education was "near abandonment." Id. at 749. The fact that the father
had an extended family to provide support for him in raising the children was a
factor which weighed heavily in his favor. Id. at 751. In contrast, the mother, a
full-time student and singer in a country western band, had left the children with
the father and his extended family in order to pursue her career and to accom-
pany her boyfriend to Texas. Id. at 749. The appellate court affirmed the finding
that "it] he mother has, in the past, demonstrated that her first priority has been
her career in music. The mother has had prolonged absences from the home on
several occasions that can only be described as near abandonment." Id.
171. 652 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1995).
172. Id. at 623. The mother took a job as Labour Counsel of the Senate La-
bor and Human Resources Committee. Id. This was ajob the trial judge found to
be "much more demanding ... in terms of both time and energy" than her previ-
ous job. Id.
173. Id. at 624.
174. Id. Specifically, the trial court found that the father had assumed a
greater portion of responsibility for providing the children's daily physical and
emotional requirements. Id. This finding was based on the testimony of a number
of witnesses. Id. An au pair, who lived with the couple for 13 months, stated that
the mother generally did not return from work until seven or eight o'clock in the
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der bias against working women.1 75 Accordingly, the court found that the
mother's work demands were properly considered and did support an
award of custody to the father, but remanded for further factual findings
on allegations of abuse.' 76
The claim of gender stereotyping, specifically as a vehicle for bias
against working women, was asserted by several amici in Prost.177 As illus-
trated in Prost, women's organizations are becoming more active as amici
in private custody disputes.1 78 This additional pressure on the courts to
preserve the rights of working mothers may not affect the ultimate deci-
sion of the court but does seem to encourage caution against the appear-
ance of bias in the decision making process.1 79
evening and had dined with the entire family on only four or five occasions during
this period. Id.
175. Id. at 623.
176. Id. The wife alleged that the husband repeatedly assaulted her and she
presented witnesses that recalled seeing bruises on her arm and foot at the time of
alleged incidents. Id. at 631. The husband denied under oath that any of these
events occurred. Id. The trial judge, noting that the wife had never filed a police
report regarding these incidents but had obtained a restraining order at the advice
of counsel at the time of final separation, never made any factual findings as to
whether abuse occurred and whether it had any bearing on her custody determina-
tion. Id. Finding this treatment of the abuse allegations "unsatisfactory," the ap-
pellate court remanded with instructions to the trial judge to make factual findings
regarding the abuse and to draw conclusions regarding the effect on custody. Id.
at 631-32.
177. Id. at 622.
178. Id. In Prost, amici briefs were filed by The Women's Legal Defense Fund,
The Feminist Majority Foundation, The Georgetown University Law Center Sex
Discrimination Clinic, The National Organization for Women, The NOW Legal
Defense & Education Fund, The Women's Bar Association of the District of Co-
lumbia and The Women's Law Project. Id.; see also Applegate v. Applegate, 461
N.W.2d 419, 420 (Neb. 1990) (filing of amicus curiae by National Center on Wo-
men and Family Law); Linda R. v. Richard E., 561 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30 (App. Div. 1990)
(filing of amicus curiae by NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund, National Or-
ganization for Women of New York State); Parris v. Parris, 460 S.E.2d 571, 571
(S.C. 1995) (filing of amicus briefs by NOW Legal Defense Education Fund,
League of Women Voters of South Carolina, South Carolina National Organiza-
tion of Women and University of South Carolina's Professional Women on
Campus).
179. Prost, 652 A.2d at 623; Parris, 460 S.E.2d at 571. Although it ultimately
rejected the assertions, the Prost court felt it necessary to directly respond to amici
claims of gender stereotyping. Prost, 652 A.2d at 623 (stating that "[w]e reject the
assertion of some amici that the judge's reasoning is infected with gender stere-
otyping"). The Supreme Court of South Carolina also tackled the issue of bias
against working mothers in Parris. Parris, 460 S.E.2d at 572-73. In Parris, the
mother, a successful realtor, claimed that the trial court displayed bias against
working women by characterizing her as "aggressive" and "career oriented." Id. at
573. The South Carolina Supreme Court, applying a gender neutral primary care-
taker standard, affirmed the award to the father finding that the record clearly
reflected that he was in fact the primary caretaker. Id. at 572. The court did,
however, caution the trial court that the terminology it used could, as it was in this
case, be taken out of context and perceived as bias. Id. at 573.
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Thus, in jurisdictions following a primary caretaker rule, the fact that
a mother works full-time generally will not prevent her from proving that
she is still the primary caretaker of the children.18 0 In contrast, where
both the mother and the father work regular hours, and father provides a
greater portion of the daily care, the father has been deemed to be the
primary caretaker. 18' Even in cases where the father is unemployed and
available at home to care for the children while the mother works, courts
may be reluctant to deny custody to a working mother. 182
Where the jurisdiction favors an award of joint custody, day care use
will generally not be sufficient to overcome the preference for joint cus-
tody.18 3 New Mexico, for example, has legislatively created a presumption
that joint custody is in the best interest of the child.' 8 4 In Fitzsimmons v.
Fitzsimmons, 185 the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed an award of cus-
tody to the father finding that the trial court decision was not supported
by the facts.' 86 The mother moved to Albuquerque to pursue an educa-
tion and a career in architecture, leaving her husband and two children in
rural New Mexico. i8 7 The trial court found that the best interests of the
children would be served by awarding custody to the father where they
would remain in the family home and be cared for by their grandmother
during the day.' 8 8 In contrast, the mother intended to place the children
180. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 492 (Cal. 1986) (finding that despite
full-time employment, mother was primary caretaker for child); Hack v. Hack, 695
S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (finding mother primary caretaker despite
fact that unemployed father had primary care during mother's work and despite
mother's alleged physical abuse of children); In re Zigler, 529 S.W.2d 909, 913
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that tender years rule reflects fact of life rather than
presumption of law and reversed award of custody to father).
181. Smith v. Smith, 448 So. 2d 381, 383 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (upholding
award to father where mother was primary caretaker for most of children's lives,
although she recently displayed primary concern with her own pleasure and pur-
suits while father curtailed work hours and devoted increasing time to child rear-
ing); Price v. Price, 440 So. 2d 1110, 1110-11 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (upholding
award of custody to father where working mother's absences from home contrib-
uted to marriage breakup); Modling v. Modling, 232 So. 2d 673, 675 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1970) (upholding award of custody to father where working mother was
often absent from home at night and father provided for daily needs); McCreery v.
McCreery, 237 S.E.2d 167, 171 (Va. 1977) (upholding award to father found to be
"mother figure" in children's eyes).
182. See, e.g., Witmayer v. Witmayer, 467 A.2d 371, 376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(denying custody to at home father who received veterans disability pension in
favor of working mother who made suitable day care arrangements).
183. Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
184. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 1978). The statute provides that the
best interest of the child shall be the standard for a court "[i] n any case ... award-
ing the custody of a minor." Id.
185. 722 P.2d 671 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 675.
188. Id. at 675-76.
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in a day care facility while she attended classes. 189 The trial court found
that the mother's use of a child care facility supported its award of custody
to the father.' 90 In reversing, the court of appeals noted that although the
trial court, which hears the evidence and is in the best position to weigh
the facts, has a great amount of discretion, it is not unfettered.' 9' Finding
that the trial court's reliance on the use of day care in making its decision
was not supported by the record, the appellate court stated:
We acknowledge that wife is required to utilize the services of
babysitters and day-care centers while husband is able to rely on
his own parents to care for the children during their periods in
Grants. The availability of such loving grandparents is certainly a
plus factor which the court can appropriately consider. How-
ever, the absence of maternal grandparents in Albuquerque and
the corresponding need to utilize paid child-care arrangements,
will not serve to deprive an otherwise good parent of shared phys-
ical custody.19 2
Furthermore, on the issue of maternal employment, the court was ad-
amant in its declaration that "[a] mother's employment should not be ac-
corded a different or negative effect when compared with a father's
employment."' 9 3 To imply that a mother is less capable or deserving of
custody because of her employment, "is not in accord with the national
trend."194
In contrast, the New Mexico Court of Appeals did find that the nature
of the mother's career was sufficient to overcome a joint custody presump-
tion in Brito v. Brito.' 95 In that case, the mother was an active duty mem-
ber of the armed forces and subject to frequent relocation.1 9 6 Both
mother and father were relying on relatives to provide child care at the
time of the custody decision.' 97 Despite the mother's argument that the
court was improperly considering her employment under Fitzsimmons, the
court of appeals distinguished this case stating that:
189. Id.
190. Id. at 675.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 675-76.
193. Id. at 675.
194. Id.
195. 794 P.2d 1205 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
196. Id. at 1207. Although the mother was presently stationed in Maryland, in
the previous five years she had been stationed in Okinawa, the Philippines, Califor-
nia, Utah, North Carolina and Maryland. Id.
197. Id. The father worked at a state penitentiary in Santa Fe, New Mexico
and left the child in the care of his paternal aunt in Taos. Id. He would spend
approximately three to four nights per week with his daughter in Taos, but while
he was working in Santa Fe, he remained there overnight and thus neither party
disputed that the aunt was the primary caretaker of the child. Id. The mother
planned to have the child cared for by her younger sister, with whom she resided
in Maryland, for the three years that she planned to be stationed in Maryland. Id.
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Here, the record does not indicate that the trial court awarded
father physical custody because it accorded the mother's employ-
ment outside the home a different effect than it accorded the
father's employment . . . . Rather, the trial court apparently
found that mother's employment situation necessarily required
frequent changes of residence, which created a residential ar-
rangement for the child that was less desirable than the available
present alternatives. 198
Despite a statutory preference for joint custody, New York offers a
dramatic example of the use of parental employment and use of day care
as a weapon against fathers. In Lenczycki v. Lenczycki, 199 custody of a seven-
year-old boy was awarded to his mother, and the father appealed. 200 The
evidence presented at trial showed that the mother had well documented
psychological problems, a histrionic personality, a history of suicide at-
tempts and that she was a pathological liar.20 1 During the marriage, the
mother had also squandered the entire family savings and incurred tens of
thousands of dollars in debt. 20 2
The only evidence offered against the father, who had been awarded
temporary custody during the proceedings, was the fact that his employ-
ment, as a partner in a New York City law firm, afforded him less opportu-
nity to spend time with the child. 203 In contrast, the mother worked only
part-time. 20 4 In affirming the trial court's grant of custody to the mother,
the court provided a dramatic illustration of how maternal bias continues
to exist despite an apparently gender neutral statute. 20 5
A more recent New York case, Wellman v. Dutch,20 6 illustrates that
even when a mother works long hours and must rely on day care, these
factors will not be weighed heavily against her.2 0 7 Although the trial court
awarded custody of an out-of-wedlock child to his married father finding
that the father had a more stable home, greater ability to provide for the
financial needs of the child and that his wife could care for the child dur-
ing the day, the appellate court reversed and gave the mother custody of
198. Id. at 1210.
199. 543 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div. 1989).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 726-28. Evidence also indicated that the mother had threatened
her son into corroborating her lies and became verbally abusive to the child when
he refused. Id. at 728.
202. Id. at 727.
203. Id. at 726. Specifically, the court described the father's job as "demand-
ing." Id.
204. Id. The trial court found that the mother's work schedule "afforded her
substantial flexibility" in caring for the child. Id.
205. Jennison, supra note 11, at 1164. Faulting both the trial and appellate
court for misapplying the neutral custody statute, Jennison argues that maternal
bias is the only explanation for the court's decision. Id.
206. 604 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 1993).
207. Id.
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the child.20 8 The mother, a single women, resided in a one bedroom
apartment with this child and a ten-year-old daughter. 20 9 The child was
dropped off at the home of a maternal aunt before six o'clock in the
morning each day and remained there for nine to thirteen hours while the
mother worked. 2 10
The appellate court reversed an award of custody to the father find-
ing that the relative financial position and home environments were erro-
neously relied on by the trial court and were outweighed by the mother's
custody of the child from birth.2 11 Thus, the court determined that the
child's best interests were served by maintaining consistency of custody
with the mother.21 2
A strong dissent would have upheld the trial court decision arguing
that it was correct in considering the relative ability of each parent to pro-
vide for the financial and environmental needs of the child.21 3 The dis-
sent argued that continuity of care is an important factor, but of less
weight under these circumstances where the court is making an initial cus-
tody determination within weeks of the child's birth.21 4 Thus, the dissent
found it appropriate for the court to consider the relative homes and day
care arrangements in deciding the best interests of the child.21 5
In Young v. Young,2 16 an Ohio court found that it is not an abuse of
discretion for a trial judge to weigh the relative merits of available day
care.21 7 The court found that both parents were fit to receive custody of a
seventeen-month-old boy.218 The mother appealed the award of custody
to the father on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by
basing its decision on the relative merits of day care, which is not a factor
listed in the custody statute.2 19 While the court of appeals stated that it
may be unreasonable for the trial court to base its award on its preference
208. Id. at 382. The father was married to another woman at the time the
child was conceived and briefly left his wife and their two children to reside with
the child's mother following the child's birth. Id. at 383. He then returned to his
wife and children. Id. at 382.
209. Id. at 383 (Denman, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Denman, J., dissenting). In addition to this child, the aunt also
cared for her own children and a disabled relative. Id. (Denman, J., dissenting).
211. Id. The court found that the record was insufficient to establish that the
father had a greater financial ability to care for the child in the first place. Id.
212. Id. The court further concluded that any financial disparity would be
leveled out by the father's obligation to pay child support. Id.
213. Id. (Denman, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 384 (Denman, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 383 (Denman, J., dissenting); see also Augustine v. Augustine, 324
A.2d 477, 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (holding that where mother and father are
both employed outside home, it is appropriate to inquire into relative ability of
child care providers).
216. Young v. Young, No. 4165, 1987 WL 12115 (Ohio Ct. App.June 3, 1987).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. The Ohio custody statute provided:
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for home care over a day care center, it held that "there can be no abuse
of discretion where the trial court grants custody to either one of two fit
parents under [the statute] .,220
The current trend toward a gender-neutral approach to custody deci-
sions is reflected in McMillen v. McMUllen,2 21 where the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the custody award of an eleven-year-old boy to his
mother.22 2 Despite the child's testimony that he was frightened by his
stepfather and often left alone, the trial court awarded, and the appellate
court affirmed, custody to the mother.223 Calling the appellate decision
"an archaic presumption that a child is best left with its mother," Justice
Nix, in a concurring opinion, made it clear that Pennsylvania now finds
any gender based presumption to be a violation of equal protection.22 4
A trial court is directed to decide custody on the basis of the best interest
of the child. In determining the child's best interest, the court is to con-
sider the following factors:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents regarding his custody;
(2) The wishes of the child regarding his custody if he is eleven years of
age or older;
(3) The child's interaction and interrelationship with his parents, sib-
lings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest;
(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
(5) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
situation.
OHIO STAT. ANN. § 3109.04(C) (repealed).
220. Young, 1987 WL 12115 at *1.
221. 602 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1992).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 847. The 11 year-old testified that his step-father frightened and
threatened him and his mother did not interfere. Id. He further testified that his
mother and step-father often left him alone after school, and that he was never left
alone while at his father's home. Id.
224. Id. at 848 (Nix, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Nix
stated that:
The facts of this case, had we heard them fifteen years ago, would have
lent themselves to only one conclusion. In 1967, this Court wrote that
'[e]very precept of the law, as well as every instinct and rule of reason,
dictate that a child of tender age should not be taken from its mother
unless brute circumstances dictate that the child would fare badly with its
mother. Nothing less than gross, inexcusable neglect, coupled with evi-
dence of unconcern and irresponsibility toward meeting the duties de-
volving upon a mother in raising her child can take her offspring away
from her.'
Id. (Nix,J., concurring) (quoting In reAustin, 233 A.2d 526, 527 (1967)). Contrast-
ing the Austin opinion with a more modern approach, Justice Nix described abso-
lute preference for maternal custody as a "sexist notion that women are uniquely
equipped to raise children." Id. (Nix, J., concurring).
Confirming that the tender years doctrine is no longer valid in Pennsylvania,
Justice Nix described the doctrine as "'offensive to the concept of the equality of
the sexes which we have embraced as a constitutional principle within this jurisdic-
tion."' Id. (Nix, J., concurring) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson,
368 A.2d 635, 639-40 (Pa. 1977)).
944 [Vol. 41: p. 909
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The availability of a relative to provide care, as opposed to a paid
provider, has been found to be an appropriate inquiry in a number of
cases. 225 For example, the mother in Harner v. Harner,226 appealing award
of custody to the father, argued that the trial court had inappropriately
weighed the role of the paternal grandmother who baby-sat for the child
before and after school each day.227 Although the court did not base its
award solely on the grandmother's role in caring for the child, however, it
did describe the availability of a grandparent to provide care, when both
of the parents work, as a factor that could favor either of the parties.2 28
The nature of parental employment often will dictate how much time
a particular parent will be able to devote to child care. For example, in
Severson v. Hansen,229 the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a custody
award to a father whose job enabled him to spend almost unlimited time
with his child.23 0 The court appointed psychologist testified that the
amount of time a parent has available to spend with a child is an impor-
tant factor in determining custody.231 The mother appealed claiming that
the trial court erred in giving weight and credibility to the psychologist
report, which she claim was biased.232 The court presented its assessment
of the proper weight to be accorded to parental employment as a factor in
custody disputes:
"A 'career mother' is not disqualified for custody of her children
any more than a working father, but where each parent works
outside of the home and where each has the ability and desire to
care for their children, the trial court must necessarily weigh the
circumstances on a fine and delicate scale."2 33
In jurisdictions where a primary caretaker presumption exists, courts
may have difficulty in determining which parent is the primary caretaker
225. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986) (finding that availability of grandparents as caregivers is positive factor, but
not sufficient to override presumption in favor of joint custody).
226. 479 A.2d 583, 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 529 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1995).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 169. The court appointed a psychologist to conduct interviews and
to prepare an evaluation and report recommending custody. Id. at 168. The trial
court awarded custody to the father based on this psychologist's recommendation
that the child would benefit from being with one parent as much as possible. Id. at
169. The court awarded the father custody because he had more free time to
spend with the child. Id. The mother obtained her own psychologist who testified
that the court appointed psychologist's report was "flawed" because it reflected
bias against working women. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D.
1985)).
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when both parents are employed full-time. In Regenscheid v. Regenscheid,2 34
for example, a Minnesota court examined the respective contributions of
parents in determining who was the primary caretaker.2 35 The trial court
awarded custody to the father after finding that neither parent was the
primary caretaker.2 3 6 The mother appealed claiming that she was the pri-
mary caretaker and entitled to custody because she had provided the bulk
of the "physical care" requirements for the children.2 37 While acknowl-
edging that the parent filling the traditional homemaker role will ordina-
rily be able to establish themselves as the primary caretaker of small
children, the appellate court stressed that "physical" care carries no more
weight than "emotional and intellectual" care.23 8
In Cooley v. Cooley,2 39 a Louisiana appellate court summed up the
modern predicament for courts by attempting to balance changing views
regarding equality of the sexes with traditional notions of the mother as
the natural custodian of minor children.2 40 The father worked long hours
as an oil field driller, twelve hour shifts, seven days on and seven days off,
but had the available assistance of his mother, brother and sister-in-law,
234. 395 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 378. The court found that each parent made equal contributions
to child rearing, and both participated in making social arrangements for the chil-
dren and scheduling day care and baby-sitters. Id. at 377. The mother provided
more physical care functions such as cooking, cleaning, laundry and shopping,
while the father provided more emotional care functions such as discipline, school
assistance and participation in scouting activities. Id.
237. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705
(Minn. 1985), adopted a list of various "indicia" to aid in determining which par-
ent is the primary caretaker. Id. at 713. The "indicia" were derived from the West
Virginia Supreme Court case, Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981), and
include:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dress-
ing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, in-
cluding nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social
interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses
or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative
care, i.e. babysitting, day-care etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, at-
tending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning;
(8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9)
educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and (10) teaching elemen-
tary skills, i.e. reading, writing and arithmetic.
Id. at 363.
238. Regenscheid, 395 N.W.2d at 379 (stating that "[w]hile ordinarily and most
often stability is maintained by the parent providing the most physical care, there
is nothing in Pikula to suggest stability is not equally maintained by the parent
providing the most emotional and intellectual care").
239. 411 So. 2d 750 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
240. Id. at 753-54. Cooley involved a custody battle for two young boys. Id. at
751. The court awarded custody to the father, who worked 12 hour days every
other week on an oil rig, over custody to the mother who, although presently un-
employed, intended to resume her prior career as a real estate broker. Id. at 752.
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with whom he resided, in providing for the care of the children. 24 1 In
contrast, the mother intended to resume her prior career as a real estate
broker and did not have any family or other means of support in the geo-
graphic area where she lived.
242
Reaffirming the abolition of the maternal preference rule in Louisi-
ana in light of evolving societal views, the court explained its current phi-
losophy as follows:
In our modern society when the wife is out equally beating the
bushes and attempting to make a career and a living and is not
with the children any more than the father might be, then there
is no practical reason for a maternal preference rule. They both,
through their physical union, gave life to the children. I suppose
the fact that under our present standards and present ideas and
concepts about the equality of the sexes-and I certainly have no
quarrel with that, I think it is the proper thing-but if it is incon-
sistent to urge one thing, the wife should have the same opportu-
nity to work outside the home and to make a career but, on the
other hand, to say, 'Well, because I am the mother of the child, I
gave birth to the child, notwithstanding the fact that I am work-
ing outside the home, nevertheless I should have the children
because I actually physically gave birth to the children.' I think
that's what the law is trying to eliminate, that type of inconsis-
tency in abolishing the maternal preference rule.243
V. CONCLUSION
At the center of any custody dispute is the best interest of the child. 244
While a number of courts have rushed to defend the rights of working
mothers, few have accorded the same defense to fathers seeking cus-
241. Id.
242. Id. The court noted that a real estate broker, in order to be successful,
must be available "all hours of the day and sometimes up in the evenings because
people look at homes and apartments after normal working hours." Id. at 753.
Making sure to emphasis that there is "nothing wrong" with a women engaging in
this type of work, the court pointed out that "if you have two babies at home, there
is a problem about making arrangements for their care." Id. The mother tried to
rely on the availability of her 18 year-old sister who attended college in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, but the court felt that the sister was too young and too far away
to provide any substantial source of support to the mother. Id.
243. Id. at 753-54.
244. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986) ("In deciding between
competing parental claims to custody, the court must make an award 'according to
the best interests of the child."'); Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d 748, 750 (N.D.
1986) (stating "[t]hat this court has established that the best interests and welfare
of the child. . . must dictate custody in a divorces action"); McMillen v. McMillen,
602 A.2d 845, 846 (Pa. 1992) (stating that "[o]ur paramount concern in child
custody cases is the best interest of the child").
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tody.245 This approach is contrary to the national trend in all other areas
of law to move away from any form of gender distinction. While the femi-
nist movement has made great strides in attaining equality for women in
the workplace in recent decades, there is a reluctance to allow the same
equality for men in child custody disputes.246 This reluctance is shared by
those courts who defend the working mother's rights while ignoring the
contributions and equal rights of fathers. Moreover, in an era when equal-
ity of the sexes is the professed goal, any presumptions or preconceived
notions of the roles of men and women as better suited to raise a child
simply have no place.
In order to achieve the professed goal of providing for the child's best
interest, the courts should focus less on the respective rights of mothers
and fathers, and more on the quality of the daily life that each respective
parent can provide. The amount of time that each parent devotes to ca-
reer pursuits and the environment in which a child may spend a majority
of his or her day are factors that substantially affect the quality of that
child's life. Accordingly, these factors are fair game and should rightly be
considered in determining custody.
Debra L. Swank
245. Burchard, 724 P.2d at 492 ("[C]ourts must not presume that a working
mother is a less satisfactory parent."); Fitzsimmons v. Fitzsimmons, 722 P.2d 671,
675 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) ("The implication that a wife, because of her employ-
ment, is less able to manage or less deserving of custody is not in accord with the
national trend.").
246. Anne P. Mitchell, The Maternal Bond, 9 AM.J. FAM. L. 125, 126-27 (1995).
Mitchell points out that:
In a day and age where the feminist movement is strong and where sexual
equality is demanded, the area of primary child care and custody appears
to have been exempted from the feminist insistence on equality and par-
ity with men .... Women don't want the umbilical cord to be severed.
Women don't want to allow men the opportunity to achieve parity with
women in terms of child rearing and custody.
Id. at 126.
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